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REVOCATION AND RETRIBUTION
Jacob Schuman*
Abstract: Revocation of community supervision is a defining feature of American criminal
law. Nearly 4.5 million people in the United States are on parole, probation, or supervised
release, and 1/3 eventually have their supervision revoked, sending 350,000 to prison each
year. Academics, activists, and attorneys warn that “mass supervision” has become a powerful
engine of mass incarceration.
This is the first Article to study theories of punishment in revocation of community
supervision, focusing on the federal system of supervised release. Federal courts apply a
primarily retributive theory of revocation, aiming to sanction defendants for their “breach of
trust.” However, the structure, statute, and purpose of supervised release all reflect a utilitarian
design justified solely by deterrence and incapacitation, not retribution.
A utilitarian approach to revocation would not just be a theoretical change, but also would
have a real-world impact by shortening prison terms, mitigating racial bias, and ending
consecutive sentencing. While scholars view courts as the government branch most protective
of criminal defendants, the judiciary has played a key role in expanding the state’s power to
punish through retributive revocation. Judges may feel a personal stake in sanctioning
disrespect of their authority, yet they should revoke supervised release only to deter and
incapacitate.
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INTRODUCTION
“The sword of Damocles hangs over a defendant every time he wakes
up to serve a day of supervised release.”1
On November 6, 2017, rapper Meek Mill appeared for a hearing in
Philadelphia court.2 Age thirty, he was a certified-platinum,
multimillionaire recording artist.3 But due to a 2008 conviction for drug
and gun possession, he was also serving a ten-year term of probation.4
Mill had appeared before the same judge multiple times over the years
on a series of technical (non-criminal) probation violations.5 The judge
had imposed a variety of punishments, including house arrest,
imprisonment, more probation, and “etiquette classes.”6 This time, Mill
was again in technical violation because eleven months earlier, he had
tested positive for opiates, possessed a drug-masking agent, traveled for
performances without giving notice to the government, and been arrested
1. United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 n.5 (2019) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
2. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Meek Mill Sentenced to 2 to 4 Years in State Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/meek-mill-sentenced-state-prisonprobation-violation-20171106.html [https://perma.cc/L5KU-S63P] (describing length of Mill’s
allocution).
3. Kory Grow, Meek Mill’s Legal Troubles: A History, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:17 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/meek-mills-legal-troubles-a-history-117981/
[https://perma.cc/KXF7-69KU].
4. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. CP-51-CR-00011614-2007, 2018 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
43, at *4–6 (Mar. 29, 2018).
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also C. Vernon Coleman II, Meek Mill Ordered by Judge to Take Etiquette Classes, XXL
(June 30, 2013), https://www.xxlmag.com/meek-mill-ordered-by-judge-to-take-etiquette-classes/
[https://perma.cc/SAH2-WT4Q].
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for fighting in an airport and recklessly driving an ATV.7
At the November 2017 hearing, Mill’s probation officer testified that
he was “meeting expectations.”8 The prosecutor recommended “probation
be continued.”9 Mill offered a forty-minute apology and plea for
leniency.10 “I’m human. I’m not perfect,” he implored.11 “I’m asking for
mercy. You gave me the ladder to do what I have to do to prevail in my
struggle. I made it this far, I can’t really go back and start over.”12
Finally, the judge announced her decision. She revoked Mill’s
probation, ordered deputies to immediately take him into custody, and
sentenced him to two to four years of imprisonment.13 “I appreciate
everything that you said,” she said, “but I have been trying to help you
since 2009 . . . and every time I do more and more and more to give you
break after break after break . . . you . . . thumb your nose at me and just
do what you want the way you want.”14 “This sentence,” the judge
declared, “is absolutely necessary to vindicate the authority of the
Court. . . . [Y]ou have no respect for this Court.”15
Mill’s imprisonment sparked a backlash against the harsh treatment of
people under community supervision, as his case became “a rallying cry
for criminal justice reform in Philadelphia.”16 Friend and fellow rapper
Jay-Z published a New York Times op-ed decrying how the criminal
justice system stalks, “entraps and harasses hundreds of thousands of
black people every day . . . consistently monitors and follows them for
any minor infraction—with the goal of putting them back in prison.”17
Legal experts explained that “one of the grounds for revoking probation
and putting someone in jail is to vindicate the authority of the court.”18

7. See Williams, 2018 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 43, at *6–7, *13–14.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Slobodzian, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. CP-51-CR-00011614-2007, 2018 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS
43, at *72 (Mar. 29, 2018).
15. Id.
16. Kristine Phillips, Meek Mill Denied Bail Again as Judge Calls Rapper a ‘Danger to the
Community’, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2017/11/20/how-rapper-meek-mills-actions-in-2007-fueled-racial-politics-in2017/ [https://perma.cc/WHY9-GAH6].
17. See Jay-Z, Jay-Z: The Criminal Justice System Stalks Black People Like Meek Mill, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/opinion/jay-z-meek-mill-probation.html
[https://perma.cc/NS6H-DY96].
18. Phillips, supra note 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Mill was “on the radar because of his prominence, but the problem” is
“happening every day to poor people.”19
Five months later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Mill bail
based on a challenge to the 2008 conviction underlying the original
probation sentence.20 He was released from prison just in time to attend a
Philadelphia 76ers game and rang a replica of the Liberty Bell “to wild
applause.”21 In 2019, he succeeded in overturning the conviction.22 The
judge who revoked his probation was removed from his case for
“unfairness and bias.”23
Mill swore not to take his victory for granted, proclaiming to a crowd
of supporters: “Meek free! I’m not on probation no more.”24 He addressed
the crowd, “I know y’all probably have family members in jail or people
going through the same thing as me,” and promised, “I will continue to do
what I do with the reform movement and help the people that help me.”25
Soon after, he joined with Jay-Z to found the REFORM Alliance,26 a
criminal justice advocacy organization “committed to changing mass
supervision laws.”27 Two years later, a probation reform bill backed by
the Alliance unanimously passed the Pennsylvania Senate.28
19. Id.
20. Dennis Romero, Rapper Meek Mill Freed on Bail on Order of Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/rapper-meekmill-be-freed-bail-order-pennsylvania-supreme-court-n868826 [https://perma.cc/NW4S-CD9M].
21. Id.
22. Bobby Allyn, Meek Mill Pleads Guilty to Misdemeanor Gun Charge, Ends 12-Year Legal Case,
NPR (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/27/754769378/meek-mill-pleadsguilty-to-misdemeanor-gun-charge-ends-12-year-legal-case [https://perma.cc/JWJ6-U6S6].
23. Milan Polk, Meek Mill Granted Retrial and New Judge, Hopes to Have ‘Injustice Rectified’,
VULTURE (June 4, 2019) (quoting Larry Krasner, Philadelphia district attorney),
https://www.vulture.com/2019/06/rapper-meek-mill-philadelphia-district-attorney-retrialsupport.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
24. Allyn, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Michelle Kim, JAY-Z, Meek Mill, Van Jones, More Launch New Criminal Justice Reform
Organization, PITCHFORK (Jan. 23, 2019), https://pitchfork.com/news/jay-z-meek-mill-van-jonesmore-launch-new-criminal-justice-reform-organization/ [https://perma.cc/X5P3-U7FP].
27. Kelly Wynne, After Kanye’s Call-out, Find out What Meek Mill Actually Believes About Prison
Reform, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2020, 3:50 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/after-kanyes-call-outfind-out-what-meek-mill-actually-believes-about-prison-reform-1519791 [https://perma.cc/EP5LH73Q].
28. Ron Southwick, Pa. Senate Unanimously Passes Bill to Reform Probation System; Supporters
Call
it
a
‘Milestone’,
PENNLIVE
(July
16,
2020,
10:16
PM),
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2020/07/pa-senate-unanimously-passes-bill-to-reform-probationsystem-supporters-call-it-a-milestone.html [https://perma.cc/LX47-QWXC]. The Senate Judiciary
Committee later amended the legislation to reflect a more modest House proposal, leading some
reform groups to drop their support. See SB14 Probation Reform, ACLU PA.,
https://www.aclupa.org/en/legislation/sb-14-probation-reform [https://perma.cc/SF5E-NX87].
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Mill’s story of revocation and redemption illustrates the extraordinary
sentencing power judges wield in an age of mass supervision. Without a
jury or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, judges can revoke defendants’
community supervision based solely on non-criminal conduct and
sentence them to years of imprisonment.29 Even if defendants are not a
risk to themselves or others, judges may punish them solely to promote
“respect” for the law.30
Revocation of community supervision is a defining feature of
American criminal justice. Nearly 4.5 million people in the United
States—more than one percent of the entire population—are currently
serving terms of community supervision,31 which is “five to ten times the
rates of European nations.”32 In total, the United States sends
approximately 350,000 people to jail or prison each year for violating
conditions of their supervision,33 accounting for more than a third of all
prisoners in thirteen states, and more than half in Arkansas, Idaho,
Missouri, and Wisconsin.34
Revocation of community supervision is “a major driver of mass
incarceration.”35 As Michelle Alexander observed, community
29. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding no right to counsel in
revocation proceedings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972) (not requiring jury or
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as “minimum requirements of due process” in revocation
proceedings).
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 2018 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 43, at *72 (Mar. 29,
2018) (citing Mill’s lack of respect for the court as justification for revoking probation).
31. Danielle Kaeble & Mariel Alper, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2017–2018, U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST. 1 (Aug. 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus1718.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YCK3-523P]; Alexi Jones, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and
Supervision
by
State,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/correctionalcontrol2018.html [https://perma.cc/5TZY-G3RG].
32. HUM. RTS. WATCH & ACLU, REVOKED: HOW PROBATION AND PAROLE FEED MASS
INCARCERATION THE UNITED STATES 34 (2020), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_docu
ment/embargoed_hrw_aclu_revoked_parole_and_probation_report_002.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QCE
-PY7C].
33. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH STAKES,
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 9 (Sept. 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/09/
probation_and_parole_systems_marked_by_high_stakes_missed_opportunities_pew.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LLN-C8R7]; see also Alan Greenblatt, Probation and Parole Violations Are
Filling up Prisons and Costing States Billions, GOVERNING (June 18, 2019),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/09/probation_and_parole_systems_marked_by_high
_stakes_missed_opportunities_pew.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFT9-BPDY] (citing approximately
280,000 people imprisoned for violations at any given time).
34. Greenblatt, supra note 33.
35. Philadelphia DAO’s Policies to End Mass Supervision, THE JUST. WIRE 1 (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://medium.com/philadelphia-justice/philadelphia-daos-policies-to-end-mass-supervisionfd5988cfe1f1 (last visited Sept. 8, 2021). A coalition of more than 100 current or former prosecutors
and probation/parole chiefs recently joined in a “Statement on the Future of Probation & Parole in the
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supervision has fueled an “increase in prison admissions,” because
“[p]robationers and parolees are . . . governed by additional rules that do
not apply to everyone else,” and “[v]iolation[s] of these special rules can
land [them] right back in prison.”36 A 2020 report by the American Civil
Liberties Union and Human Rights Watch found that rates of revocation
have increased dramatically since the 1980s, from a small fraction to
almost one-half of all prison admissions.37 Between 1970 and 2008, the
percent of U.S. state and federal prison admissions stemming from
violations of community supervision more than doubled, from 16% to
36%, before falling slightly to 28% in 2018.38 In state prisons, 45% of all
admissions are for probation and parole violations. Even these numbers
exclude people incarcerated for violations in jails, for which there is little
data.39
Revocation of community supervision both reflects and amplifies racial
inequality. A 2018 study showed that “Black adults are about 3.5 times as
likely as whites to be supervised,” and make up “30 percent of those on
probation or parole” despite only being “13 percent of the U.S. adult
population.”40 Controlling for nonracial and nonethnic characteristics,
Black probationers also have “substantially and statistically significant
higher odds of revocation,” with “[t]he odds of revocation for white
probationers . . . between 18 and 39 percent lower than for their black
counterparts.”41 As activist Bryan Stevenson observed in the wake of
United States,” declaring that “[m]ass supervision has taken an enormous human and fiscal toll” and
“become overly burdensome, punitive and a driver of mass incarceration.” Statement on the Future
of Probation & Parole in the United States, EXIT https://www.exitprobationparole.org/statement
[https://perma.cc/4XVE-EPWY]; see also Priscilla A. Ocen, Awakening to a Mass-Supervision
Crisis, ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/12/
parole-mass-supervision-crisis/604108/ [https://perma.cc/8EJK-Y2T8].
36. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 119 (10th ed. 2020).
37. HUM. RTS. WATCH & ACLU, supra note 32 at 1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jake Horowitz & Connie Utada, Community Supervision Marked by Race and Gender
Disparities,
PEW
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2018/12/06/community-supervision-marked-by-racial-and-gender-disparities
[https://perma.cc/TV25-K5PF]; see also Michael Winerip, Michael Schwirtz & Robert Gebeloff, For
Blacks Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/04/nyregion/new-york-prisons-inmates-parole-race.html
[https://perma.cc/TZ89-JPF2] (finding that Black and Hispanic prisoners are less likely to be granted
early release at their first parole hearing).
41. JESSE JANNETTA, JUSTIN BREAUX, HELEN HO & JEREMY PORTER, URB. INST., EXAMINING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN PROBATION REVOCATION 4 (Apr. 2014),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22746/413174-Examining-Racial-and-EthnicDisparities-in-Probation-Revocation.PDF [https://perma.cc/6PPW-7XT3]; see also Kendra Bradner
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Mill’s sentencing, revocation is “burdened by the history of racial
inequality.”42
While legal scholars have long debated the philosophical justifications
for penalizing criminal conduct,43 no one has considered the theories of
punishment underlying revocation of community supervision.44 Aside
from the death penalty, “punishment theory says surprisingly little about
types of sanctions,” instead describing sentencing in “abstract terms” like
“‘hard treatment’ or ‘unpleasant consequences’ or ‘legal deprivation,’”
but not explaining “why incarceration, fines, or any other specific sanction
is permissible or appropriate.”45 As Alice Ristroph argued, this abstract
analysis “loses connection with real practices,” leading scholars to
“assume the existence of some entity that will impose the punishment.”46
Punishment theorists simply call that entity the “state,” without
considering “who or what constitutes the state, and how its various
subsidiary institutions work together.”47
One reason revocation of community supervision may have failed to
attract scholarly attention is that violators are sometimes viewed as
dangerous or hopeless recidivists, undeserving of social concern. As the
United States Supreme Court put it, revocations represent “the problem
case[s] among problem cases.”48 Nevertheless, people under supervision
& Vincent Schiraldi, Racial Inequities in New York Parole Supervision, COLUM. U. JUST. LAB 5, 8,
10 (Mar. 2020), https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/NY%20Parole%20Racial
%20Inequities.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YA9-3X6A] (finding that Black and Latinx people in New
York are more likely to be under parole supervision, more likely to be detained pending a parole
violation hearing, and more likely to be imprisoned for a parole violation); Michael Tapia & Patricia
M. Harris, Race and Revocation: Is there a Penalty for Young, Minority Males?, 4 J. ETHNICITY CRIM.
JUST. 1, 8, 14, 18 (2006) (finding that Black probationers in a “large south central state” were 66%
more likely to have their probation revoked).
42. Bobby Allyn, From Prison, Meek Mill Vows to Champion Changes in Pa. Criminal Justice
System, WHYY (Mar. 13, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/prison-meek-mill-vows-championchanges-pa-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/Y58L-Q3LK].
43. Debates over punishment philosophy date back at least 200 years, to Immanuel Kant and
Jeremy Bentham. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194–98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887)
(arguing for retributivism); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 1, 14–18, 83–85 (Batoche Books 2020) (arguing for utilitarianism). Since then,
“moral philosophers have killed many forests answering this question.” Paul H. Robinson, The
Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1089, 1089 (2010).
44. Despite a surplus of articles on sentencing theory, there is only one 1988 piece examining the
philosophy of punishment in probation revocation, and nothing on parole or supervised release. See
Bradford C. Mank, Postsentence Sentencing: Determining Probation Revocation Sanctions, 18
CUMB. L. REV. 437 (1988).
45. Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017, 1020, 1039–44 (2014).
46. Id. at 1039–40.
47. Id. at 1040.
48. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000).
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are also human beings with basic constitutional rights and inherent dignity
who deserve study and attention.49 On a more practical level, states spend
a total of $9.3 billion annually imprisoning people for violations of
community supervision, not including costs of jailing them before
hearings.50 Given the constitutional, humanitarian, and fiscal interests,
revocation is a significant matter of social policy.
This is the first Article to study theories of punishment in revocation of
community supervision, focusing on the federal system of supervised
release.51 Federal judges apply a primarily retributive theory of
revocation, aiming to punish defendants for their “breach of trust.”52
However, the structure, statute, and purpose of supervised release all
reflect purely utilitarian goals of deterrence and incapacitation, not
retribution.53 A utilitarian approach to revocation would not just be a
philosophical change, but also would have a significant real-world impact
by shortening prison terms, mitigating implicit racial bias, and eliminating
the justification for consecutive sentencing.54 While scholars typically
view courts as the government branch most protective of criminal

49. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
50. Confined and Costly: How Supervision Violations Are Filling Prisons and Burdening Budgets,
JUST.
CTR.,
THE
COUNCIL
OF
STATE
GOV’TS
(June
18,
2019),
https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/confined-costly/ [https://perma.cc/DYR9-HB5J].
51. One possible objection to comparing revocation of supervision with ordinary criminal
sentencing is that ordinary sentencing “is the act of imposing sanctions for criminal behavior, proven
in a court following a trial or plea of guilty,” whereas revocation “is merely the continuing application
of that original sentence.” Jeremy Travis, Back-End Sentencing: A Practice in Search of a Rationale,
74 SOC. RSCH.: INT’L Q. 631, 632 (2007). This distinction is technically accurate for revocation of
supervised release, which is legally considered punishment for the original conviction, not the
violation conduct itself. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700 (adopting this view to avoid “the serious
constitutional questions that would be raised by construing revocation and reimprisonment as
punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised release”). However, “the conceptual and
operational similarities between the two systems are . . . so compelling,” that revocation should be
regarded as “a form of sentencing,” despite the formal distinction. Travis, supra, at 632, 634. As
Jeremy Travis explained:
In both systems, we use the enforcement agencies of the state (police or parole) to detect
violations of rules (criminal laws or conditions of supervision), arrest and detain those suspected
of those infractions (defendants or parole violators), bring cases and suspects before a neutral
adjudicative entity (judge or hearing officer), provide an opportunity for determinations of fact
through adversarial process (with some distinctions between the systems), determine guilt (with
differing levels of proof) and impose sanctions for violations of those rules, up to and including
the deprivation of liberty.”
Id. at 632. Since revocation of supervised release imposes a prison term as a penalty for a violation
of legal rules of conduct, it is substantively a form of sentencing, not just administration of the original
sentence.
52. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
53. See infra Part 0.
54. See infra sections III.0–.B.
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defendants,55 the judiciary has instead played a key role in expanding the
state’s power to punish through the retributive theory of revocation.56
Rather than sanction violators for disrespecting their authority, judges
should revoke supervised release only to deter and incapacitate.
Part I reviews the law and history of supervised release. The statute
authorizing revocation omits retribution as a factor to consider, yet a
majority of Supreme Court justices, the Sentencing Commission, and the
circuit courts have adopted a “primarily” retributive theory of revocation
sentencing focused on sanctioning defendants for their “breach of trust.”57
Trial judges revoke supervised release for retribution, even though that
factor is the only theory of punishment not listed in the statute as a
consideration.58
Part II argues that the retributive theory of revocation contradicts the
structure, statute, and purpose of supervised release, which all reflect a
purely utilitarian goal of ensuring the defendant’s safe and successful
return to the community:
The structure of conditional liberty under supervised release involves
no act of grace or risk by the government, so there is no “trust” for
defendants to “breach.”
The statute governing revocation of supervised release deliberately
omits retribution from the factors judges may consider.
The purpose of supervised release is to ease the transition to the
community, not punish wrongdoing.
Finally, Part III shows that a purely utilitarian theory of revocation
would shorten prison terms, mitigate implicit racial bias, and end the
arbitrary and unnecessary practice of consecutive revocation sentencing.
While the traditional narrative of criminal law portrays courts as the
branch of government most likely to limit criminal liability, retributive
revocation reveals the federal judiciary’s role in expanding the state’s
power to punish violators. Judges may feel a personal stake in sanctioning
disrespect of their authority, but they should solely consider deterrence
and incapacitation when revoking supervised release.

55. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510,
541, 557, 576 (2001).
56. See infra section III.0.
57. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
58. See infra section I.C.0 (discussing cases in which judges revoked supervised release for
retribution).
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THEORIES OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 59 Congress replaced parole with
a new form of supervision called supervised release, intended “to ease the
defendant’s transition into the community.”60 Two years later, Congress
authorized judges to revoke supervised release, but limited the purposes
to deterrence and incapacitation, not retribution.61 Despite this utilitarian
design, the Sentencing Commission, the Supreme Court, and the circuit
courts have all endorsed a primarily retributive theory of revoking
supervised release, aimed at sanctioning defendants for their “breach of
trust.”62
A.

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

Congress created the modern federal sentencing system in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.63 The Act endorses two basic theories of
punishment, retributivism and utilitarianism.64 The law then instructs
sentencing judges to selectively apply these theories depending on the
kind of punishment they impose.65
Retributivism, also known as non-consequentialism, is the theory that
criminals deserve “just punishment” based on their “moral culpability.”66
This is a metaphysical justification rooted in “a commitment to asserting
moral truth in the face of its denial.”67 Retributivist sentencing is
backward-looking, attempting to balance the offender’s blameworthy
conduct with an equivalent penalty. Crime violates the “primary rules” of

59. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991–98).
60. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124–25 (1983).
61. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-7 (1986) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)).
62. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
63. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–67 (1989).
64. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(a), 3572(a) 3582(a). A third theory of punishment is restorative justice,
which uses a “negotiated outcome” to “allow participants . . . to decide upon resolutions that emerge
from particular circumstances.” Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1268–69 (2005). However, “mainstream punishment theory,”
which aims “to impose external constraints and consistency rules on outcomes,” has “not yet been
able to encompass” this approach. Id.
66. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007); see also Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth
of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179–82 (1988).
67. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124–28 (1988).
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society, and punishment serves to “restore[] the equilibrium.”68 As Justice
Holmes put it, “there is a mystic bond between wrong and
punishment . . . wrong being the negation of right, punishment is the
negation of that negation, or retribution.”69
Utilitarianism, also known as consequentialism, is the belief that
criminal defendants should be punished to “increase the general
welfare.”70 This approach focuses on the three “useful purposes that
punishment serves”—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.71
Utilitarian sentencing is forward-looking, concerned not with moral
culpability but achieving good outcomes. Crime harms society, and
punishment serves to reduce the frequency of that harmful conduct. In the
memorable words of the Marquis of Halifax: “Men are not hang[e]d for
stealing Horses, but that Horses may not be stolen.”72
In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress endorsed both retributive and
utilitarian theories of punishment. Title 18, Section 3553(a) lists ten
“[f]actors to be considered in imposing a sentence,” including four
“purposes” of punishment:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment
in the most effective manner.73
These four purposes correspond to (A) retributivism and (B–
D) utilitarianism. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]hese four
68. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 476–79 (1968). A theory of
punishment seeking to restore social equilibrium in order “to prevent lynchings, blood feuds, and
other ugly forms of self-help,” or to “promote[] social solidarity,” would be utilitarian, not
retributivist, because it would treat punishment as a “signaling mechanism” that produces good
outcomes, not as an “intrinsic good” in itself. Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal
Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 15–17 (2003).
69. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 42 (1881).
70. Id. at 47.
71. KENT GREENAWALT, Punishment, 3 ENCYC. OF CRIME & JUST. 1282–84 (2d ed. 2002); see also
Ristroph, supra note 45, at 1038; Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316–
17 (2000) (explaining the “utilitarian purposes” of punishment in more detail).
72. GEORGE SAVILE, A CHARACTER OF KING CHARLES THE SECOND: AND POLITICAL, MORAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS 72 (1750).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). The other factors are “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), “the kinds of sentences
available,” § 3553(a)(3), and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.”, § 3553(a)(6).
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considerations—retribution,
deterrence,
incapacitation,
and
rehabilitation—are the four purposes of sentencing generally, and a court
must fashion a sentence ‘to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent that
they are applicable’ in a given case.”74
Having defined these four theories of punishment, the Act then
incorporates them into sentencing practice by cross-referencing them to
the different kinds of “authorized sentences.”75 When a judge sentences a
defendant, each theory of punishment “may apply differently, or even not
at all, depending on the kind of sentence” imposed.76 For example, when
sentencing a defendant to probation, the Act states that the judge “shall
consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable.”77
When sentencing a defendant to imprisonment, the Sentencing Reform
Act instructs that the judge “shall consider the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that
imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.”78 The emphasized language means that judges may
sentence defendants to imprisonment based on all “the specified rationales
of punishment except for rehabilitation,” which is “an unsuitable
justification for a prison term.”79 The reason the law excludes
rehabilitation as a factor justifying imprisonment is that Congress had
concluded that “the system’s attempt to ‘achieve rehabilitation of
offenders had failed’” and that prisons lacked “the capacity . . . to
rehabilitate.”80 While the Act endorses four theories of punishment, the
statute selectively applies these theories in order to limit each kind of
punishment to its proper purpose.
B.

Supervised Release

The Sentencing Reform Act also created a new kind of sentence called
“supervised release,” which replaced parole.81 Although courts generally
view parole, probation, and supervised release as the same basic sentence

74. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b).
76. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 326.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3562(a).
78. Id. § 3582(a) (emphasis added).
79. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 327 (emphasis in original).
80. Id. at 324, 327 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989)). In fact, the Act
does not even “grant[] courts the power to ensure that offenders participate in prison rehabilitation
programs.” Id. at 330.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
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of community supervision,82 they are actually very different penalties.
Recognizing the differences between these forms of supervision is the key
to understanding theories of punishment in revocation of supervised
release.
Probation, parole, and supervised release are all terms of supervision
by a probation officer served outside prison, subject to a set of
conditions.83 But while these terms of supervision may look the same,
each bears a different relationship to the defendant’s prison sentence.
Probation and parole reduce prison time by allowing the defendant to
avoid prison or obtain early release. Supervised release, by contrast, adds
to imprisonment by imposing more supervision after completion of the
prison sentence.
This distinction reflects the different theories of punishment underlying
probation, parole, and supervised release. Probation and parole emerged
from the penal reform movement of the mid-nineteenth century,84
“premised on a faith in rehabilitation.”85 Probation allowed a defendant to
avoid imprisonment by serving a term of supervision in the community.86
The supervision was “designed to provide a period of grace in order to aid
the rehabilitation of a penitent offender,” and was “conferred as a
privilege . . . a matter of favor,” not “a right.”87 Today, probation remains
available in the federal system for first-time offenders charged with minor
offenses.88
Parole began as a way to encourage prisoners to reform themselves by
promising early release in exchange for good behavior. The federal parole
system, established in 1910, allowed defendants who served one-third of
their prison sentences89 to go before the Parole Commission and ask for
early release.90 The Commission would evaluate their records and decide
82. See generally Jacob Schuman, Supervised Release Is Not Parole, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 587
(2020) (criticizing this trend with respect to supervised release and parole).
83. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.1–1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (noting
federal Sentencing Guidelines for imposing a term of probation or supervised release).
84. HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 68–76,
135–43 (13th ed. 2018).
85. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 323–24.
86. ABADINSKY, supra note 84, at 68–76.
87. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(describing sentencing guidelines for imposing probation).
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(a), 4206(a) (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)). Federal judges
also had discretion to make defendants they sentenced eligible for parole at an earlier date. See 18
U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (repealed 1987).
90. The Parole Commission was an agency within the Department of Justice, with members
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whether they had been “rehabilitated and should be released from
confinement.”91 After release, the parolees would be subject to
“conditions of parole” and supervised by a parole officer.92 If they violated
a condition, then the Commission could revoke their release and send
them back to prison to serve the rest of their original sentence.93 Parole
was also known as “indeterminate sentencing” because the ultimate length
of the prison term was not decided by the judge at the sentencing hearing,
but rather by parole commissioners, depending on the defendant’s
behavior in prison.94 At the system’s height, at least two-thirds of all
federal prisoners were granted parole.95
Beginning in the 1960s and 70s, however, Americans began to lose
faith in the rehabilitative theory of imprisonment. Lawmakers came to
believe that “the system’s attempt to ‘achieve rehabilitation of offenders
had failed,’” as they “increasingly doubted that prison programs could
‘rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis’—or that parole officers could
‘determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner ha[d] been
rehabilitated.’”96 Critics questioned the “supposed expertise of parole
officials,”97 who seemed to exercise their power in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.98 Reformers called for “truth in sentencing,” so
that defendants and victims would know the length of the sentence on the
day it was imposed.99
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress abolished parole in
favor of a “determinate” approach to punishment.100 Going forward,

appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal
Parole System: Part I (1910–1972), 61 FED. PROB. 23, 23 (1997).
91. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 324 (2011). Parole regulations instructed that the
Commission should grant release if the prisoner had “substantially observed the rules of the
institution” and release would not “depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for
the law” or “jeopardize the public welfare.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(a), 4206(a)(1)–(2) (1982), repealed
by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2006)).
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4209, 4214 (1984), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742).
93. Id.
94. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 323–24.
95. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part). By comparison, three-quarters of state prisoners were granted parole. Joan
Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479, 489 (1999).
96. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 324–25 (first quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989);
then quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983)).
97. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 109 (1973).
98. See Schuman, supra note 82, at 600.
99. United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2389 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 325.
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federal prisoners would no longer be eligible for early release. Instead, all
defendants would be required to serve at least 85% of their prison terms,
with the Bureau of Prisons awarding 15% “good time” credit to wellbehaved inmates.101
The Sentencing Reform Act created “supervised release” to “ease the
defendant’s transition into the community” following completion of the
prison sentence.102 Congress intended this new form of post-release
supervision to rationalize the system. Under parole, the length of the
supervision term was often arbitrary, turning “on the almost sheer
accident” of how much time was left on the defendant’s prison term.103 A
well-behaved prisoner would win early parole and then serve a long term
of supervision, while a poorly behaved prisoner would not be paroled and
then have no supervision after release.104
Unlike parole, lawmakers intended supervised release to be based on
each individual defendant’s particular needs. Congress authorized
sentencing judges to impose supervised release to follow imprisonment
depending on the unique facts of each case105 in order to focus resources
on defendants “who actually need supervision,”106 using “the district
courts’ discretionary judgment to allocate supervision to those releasees
who needed it most.”107 The Senate Report makes clear that judges should
not impose supervision as “punishment,” which “will have been served to
the extent necessary by the term of imprisonment.”108
In the most significant break from parole practice, Congress did not
create any mechanism for revoking supervised release. Under parole, the

101. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). The original Sentencing Reform Act gave defendants only 10% good
time credit, requiring them to serve 90% of their prison terms, but a later amendment slightly
increased the available credit to 15%. See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The
Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 996 (2013); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 226 n.10 (1993).
102. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124–25 (1983).
103. Id. at 124.
104. See id. at 122–23.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).
106. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983).
107. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000). The Sentencing Commission later
undermined Congress’s attempt to selectively impose supervision by adopting Guidelines that
recommend judges impose supervised release on all defendants sentenced to more than one-year
imprisonment. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
Congress also backtracked on its original goal of limiting post-release supervision by creating
mandatory-minimum supervised release terms for certain crimes. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (mandating five-year minimum supervised release term for first-time drug
offenders).
108. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983).
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Parole Commission had broad power to revoke release if a defendant
violated a condition. Parole revocations were conducted before an
administrative board, with no jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or
formal rules of evidence.109 In designing supervised release, however,
lawmakers “d[id] not believe that a minor violation of a
condition . . . should result in resentencing of the defendant.”110 If any
defendants flagrantly and repeatedly violated their conditions, they could
be charged with contempt of court or a new crime,111 which would require
a full criminal prosecution and trial, with all the traditional constitutional
rights.112
Just two years after the Sentencing Reform Act, however, Congress
dramatically changed the system by adding a provision empowering
judges to revoke supervised release. The Anti-Drug-Abuse Act of 1986113
authorized judges to sentence defendants to imprisonment for violations
of supervised release in proceedings without a jury and using a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof.114 In 1987, 1994, 2002,
and 2003, lawmakers voted to toughen revocation by imposing longer
revocation sentences, more supervised release to follow revocation, and
mandatory revocation for drug-, gun-, and sex-related violations.115
The statutory scheme for revoking supervised release is intricate, yet
precise. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), the provision reads:
The court may, after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5),
(a)(6), and (a)(7) . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and
require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of
supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that
resulted in such term of supervised release.116
This long list of cross-references includes all the purposes of punishment

109. See Schuman, supra note 82, at 590–91, 604.
110. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125.
111. Id.
112. Doherty, supra note 101, at 1000.
113. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-7 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)).
114. The maximum prison sentence a judge can impose when revoking supervised release depends
on the class of the defendant’s original conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The guidelines range for
the revocation sentence, by contrast, turns on the nature of the violation and the defendant’s criminal
history. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.4(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); see
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1.
115. See Schuman, supra note 82, at 603–07.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
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except one—§ 3553(a)(2)(A), or retribution.117
Today, revocation of supervised release is a major function of the
federal criminal justice system. Judges impose supervised release in 99%
of cases where the defendant is sentenced to more than one year in
prison,118 with more than 50,000 people beginning terms of supervised
release each year,119 and the average term lasting forty-seven months.120
One-third of all defendants eventually have their supervised release
revoked and are sent back to prison, for an average eleven-month prison
sentence.121 In 2019 alone, federal judges revoked release in nearly 16,500
cases, making revocations about 15–20% of all federal sentencings.122
Approximately 110,000 people are currently subject to supervised release,
and according to a 2010 report, more than 12,000 were in prison for
violations.123

117. Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), 3553(a)(3). The provision mandating revocation for drug- and gunrelated violations does not include a list of considerations, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), but circuit courts
hold that mandatory revocation is governed by the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Thornhill,
759 F.3d 299, 307–310 (3d Cir. 2014).
118. Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 4 (July 2010),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf [perma.cc/3W8K-FL85].
119. Federal Probation System Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS. tbl.E-1 (Dec.
31, 2019) [hereinafter Table E-1], https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-1/statistical-tablesfederal-judiciary/2019/12/31 [https://perma.cc/4UC4-7AEL].
120. Number of Offenders on Federal Supervised Release Hits All-Time High, PEW (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/01/number-of-offenders-onfederal-supervised-release-hits-all-time-high [https://perma.cc/8ETS-LY6L].
121. Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 4, 63. Although the
eleven-month figure comes from a 2010 report, it matches the findings of the Sentencing
Commission’s 2020 report, which addressed probation and supervised release violations. Federal
Probation and Supervised Release Violations, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 34 (July 2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2020/20200728_Violations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SYU-Y872] (analyzing probation
and supervised release violations together).
122. Federal Probation System Judicial Business, U.S. CTS. tbl.E-7A (Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter
Table
E-7A],
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-7a/judicial-business/2020/09/30
[https://perma.cc/CAM3-QGHK] (recording 16,383 revocations); U.S. District Courts–Criminal
Judicial Business, U.S. CTS. tbl.D-5 (Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Table D-5],
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-5/judicial-business/2019/09/30 [https://perma.cc/QJ8U7HG7] (recording 78,767 sentencings following conviction). The total number of revocation hearings
is probably slightly higher, as judges only revoke release 85% of the time the government seeks
revocation. Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations, supra note 121, at 34.
123. Federal Probation System Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS. tbl.E-2 (Dec.
31, 2019) [hereinafter Table E-2], https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/e-2/statistical-tablesfederal-judiciary/2019/12/31 [https://perma.cc/4UC4-7AEL]; Federal Offenders Sentenced to
Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 69.

Schuman (Do Not Delete)

898
C.

10/11/2021 3:55 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:881

Retributive Theory of Revocation

When judges revoke supervised release, the Sentencing Commission,
a majority of Supreme Court Justices, and the circuit courts have endorsed
a primarily retributive theory of punishment, aimed at sanctioning
defendants for their “breach of trust.”124 Defendants have challenged the
retributive theory of revocation as contrary to the language of the statute,
but the lower courts have rejected their arguments. While there is a circuit
split as to whether § 3583(e)(3) fully endorses retributive revocation, no
circuit prohibits district judges from considering retribution when
revoking supervised release.
1.

Sentencing Commission

In 1990, the United States Sentencing Commission published the first
official Sentencing Guidelines on revocation of supervised release.125 The
Guidelines address supervised release together with probation in a “single
set of policy statements.”126 They state that supervised release and
probation share the same “purpose” of “integrati[ng] of the violator into
the community, while providing the supervision designed to limit further
criminal conduct.”127 Therefore, the Guidelines conclude, “violations of
the conditions of probation and supervised release a[re] functionally
equivalent.”128
According to the introductory note preceding the Guidelines on
revocation, the Commission considered “two different approaches to
sanctioning violations of probation and supervised release.”129 The first
approach would punish a violation as a “breach of trust inherent in the
conditions of supervision,” with “revocation . . . intended to sanction the
violator for failing to abide by the conditions of court-ordered
supervision.”130 The second would seek to “sanction violators for the
particular conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were being
124. See infra sections I.C.0–3.
125. Earlier editions included extremely bare-boned preliminary revocation guidelines that said
nothing about theories of punishment. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7A1.1–.4 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 1989); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7A1.1–.4 (1988); U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7A1.1–.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1987); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 7A1.1–.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1986).
126. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7A3(b), 7A4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1990); id. § 7B.
The remainder of this section cites to the current version of the Guidelines, which is substantively the
same as the 1990 edition.
127. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
128. Id. § 7B.
129. Id. § 7A3(b).
130. Id.
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sentenced as new federal criminal conduct.”131 In other words, the
Commission considered either punishing defendants for violating the
judge’s order to follow the conditions of release, or instead punishing
them for the conduct underlying that violation as though it were a new
crime.
Ultimately, the Commission endorsed the first, “breach of trust”
approach, concluding that a “detailed revocation guideline system” based
on underlying conduct would be “impractical” due to “the wide variety of
behavior that can lead to revocation.”132 The Commission also expressed
concern that if a defendant under supervision committed a new crime, then
revocation based on the underlying conduct “would have the revocation
court substantially duplicate the sanctioning role of the court with
jurisdiction over . . . [the] new criminal conduct,” meaning any sentence
for the revocation would have to “to run concurrently with, and thus
generally be subsumed in, any sentence imposed for that new criminal
conduct.”133 Because the Commission believed that “as a breach of trust
inherent in the conditions of supervision, the sanction for the violation of
trust should be in addition, or consecutive, to any sentence imposed for
the new conduct,” it adopted the view that revocation would “sanction
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the
criminal history of the violator.”134
Courts have interpreted this “breach of trust” concept as reflecting a
retributive theory of revocation. United States v. Blackston135 is a good
example. In that case, a defendant on supervised release tested positive
for cocaine and admitted to using drugs.136 The judge revoked his release
and sentenced him to the maximum of three years’ imprisonment, telling
him: “I put you on supervised release thinking that you would do better,
you didn’t. You ignored that trust. For that violation of trust you are going
to go back to jail.”137 The judge warned that supervised release was “a
long rope that will reach out . . . so you can be dragged in here to account
for your activities.”138 By punishing the defendant to hold him
accountable for his breach of trust, the judge applied a retributive theory
of revocation.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
940 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id.
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United States Supreme Court

In 2019, the Supreme Court issued its first landmark decision on
supervised release in United States v. Haymond,139 with a majority of
justices endorsing a retributive theory of revocation.140 In Haymond, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which
imposed a five-year, mandatory-minimum sentence on sex offenders who
violated their supervised release by committing another sex offense.141
The Court struck down the mandatory minimum, but split 4-1-4 on the
reasoning. Justice Breyer’s decisive concurrence joined the plurality in
striking down § 3583(k), yet agreed with the dissent’s retributive theory
of revocation.142
Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion applied a formal analysis that
invalidated the mandatory minimum without taking any substantive view
on the justifications for revoking supervised release.143 According to him,
§ 3583(k) violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey,144 which held that any fact
increasing a defendant’s sentencing range must be proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.145 Because § 3583(k) increased the defendant’s
minimum sentence to five years based on a violation found by a judge,
not a jury, the provision violated the jury right.146
The Supreme Court had never applied Apprendi to parole revocation,
yet Justice Gorsuch found supervised release distinguishable, because it
did not “replace a portion of the defendant’s prison term,” but rather ran
“after the completion of his prison term.”147 This “structural difference”
bore “constitutional consequences,” he explained, because parole
revocation “exposed a defendant only to the remaining prison term,”
while § 3583(k) imposed an “additional” prison sentence that could last
“beyond that authorized by the jury’s verdict.”148 Therefore, he concluded,
139. __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality opinion).
140. See id. Between 1984 and 2019, the Court issued five decisions on supervised release, all
involving technical issues of statutory interpretation and none addressing the justifications for
revocation. Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694
(2000); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000); Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395
(1991).
141. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2373.
142. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 2378–79.
144. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
145. See id.
146. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2381–82.
147. Id. at 2382 (2019) (emphasis in original).
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
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parole revocation was consistent with Apprendi, while § 3583(k) was not.
In his dissent, Justice Alito advocated for upholding § 3583(k) based
on a retributive view of revocation.149 He “start[ed] with the proposition
that the old federal parole system did not implicate the . . . jury trial right,”
and that revocation of supervised release was “not fundamentally
different,” having “changed the form” of supervision rather than its
“substance.”150 Like parole revocation, “[t]he principal reason for
assigning a penalty to a supervised-release violation is . . . that the
violative act is a breach of trust.”151 Since the jury right only applies to
punishment for “criminal conduct,” it should not apply to revocation of
supervised release, which is instead “designed to ‘sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust.’”152
Justice Alito warned that applying Apprendi to § 3583(k) would cast
all revocation of supervised release into doubt. He highlighted language
in the plurality opinion suggesting that revocations “must be conducted in
compliance with the Sixth Amendment—which means that the defendant
is entitled to a jury trial, which means that as a practical matter supervisedrelease revocation proceedings cannot be held.”153 Under the plurality’s
logic, he cautioned, “the whole concept of supervised release” would
“come crashing down.”154
The deciding vote came down to Justice Breyer, who joined the
plurality in invalidating § 3583(k) but also “agree[d] with much of the
dissent, in particular that the role of the judge in a supervised-release
proceeding is consistent with that of traditional parole.”155 Like the
dissent, Justice Breyer endorsed a retributive view of revocation, quoting
the Sentencing Guidelines: “The consequences that flow from violation
of the conditions of supervised release are first and foremost considered
sanctions for the defendant’s ‘breach of trust,’” “not ‘for the particular
conduct triggering the revocation as if that conduct were being sentenced
as new federal criminal conduct.’”156 Furthermore, Justice Breyer said he
would not apply Apprendi to revocation of supervised release due to the

149. Id. at 2391–400 (Alito, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2391 (Alito, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2393 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
152. Id. (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)).
153. Id. at 2388.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2386 (citing U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018)).
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“potentially destabilizing consequences.”157
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer voted to invalidate § 3583(k) based on
“three aspects” that made it “less like ordinary revocation and more like
punishment for a new offense, to which the jury right would typically
attach.”158 First, the penalty applied to “a discrete set of federal criminal
offenses.”159 Second, it “t[ook] away the judge’s discretion to decide
whether a violation of a condition of supervised release should result in
imprisonment and for how long.”160 And third, it “limit[ed] the judge’s
discretion” in the “particular manner” of “imposing a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of ‘not less than 5 years.’”161 Because
these three features were “difficult to reconcile” with the “typical[]”
understanding of revocation, Justice Breyer found that § 3583(k) violated
the jury right.162 Ironically, this decisive (and controlling163) concurrence
applied the dissent’s retributive theory of revocation to join the plurality
in striking down the five-year mandatory-minimum sentence.
3.

United States Courts of Appeal

Criminal defendants have challenged the retributive theory of
revocation as violating the language of the Sentencing Reform Act, which
omits retribution as a factor for judges to consider when revoking
supervised release. In fact, § 3583(e)(3) lists eight factors to be
considered, yet excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A), the retributive theory of
punishment. Nevertheless, the courts of appeals have unanimously held
that judges may revoke supervised release for retribution, although there
is a circuit split as to how much emphasis they may place on this factor.
The First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the
omission of retribution from the list of required considerations does not
prohibit judges from considering it.164 According to these courts, the
statute’s enumeration of § 3553(a) factors judges must consider does not
157. Id. at 2385.
158. Id. at 2386.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. As the narrower opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence sets forth the holding of the Court. See
id. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Breyer’s “narrow[er]” opinion contains “today’s
holding”); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193–94 (1977) (explaining that when there
is no majority opinion, the narrowest opinion controls); United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550, 552
(5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 295 (4th Cir. 2020).
164. See United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Young, 634 F.3d
233 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Vargas-Davila, 649 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006).
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prevent judges from also considering other relevant factors as well.165 As
the Third Circuit put it, “[t]he mere omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the
mandatory supervised release revocation considerations” does not
“preclude a court from taking into account . . . the need for the resulting
sentence to promote respect for the law and provide just punishment.”166
These circuits further contend that § 3553(a)(2)(A) is “inextricably
intertwined,”167 or “essentially redundant with,”168 considerations that
judges must weigh when revoking supervised release. For example,
judges must consider “the seriousness of the offense”169 when
contemplating other listed factors such as “the nature and circumstances
of the offense,” the need to “afford adequate deterrence,” and the need to
“protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”170 Therefore,
they say, it would be impossible to exclude this factor from
consideration.171
Finally, these circuits cite the Sentencing Guidelines as endorsing a
retributive theory of revocation sentencing. The Sixth Circuit quoted the
Guidelines in explaining that “revocation sentences are . . . intended to
‘sanction,’ or, analogously, to ‘provide just punishment for the offense’
of violating supervised release.”172
165. See, e.g., Young, 634 F.3d at 239 (“[T]he enumeration . . . of specified subsections of
§ 3553(a) that a court must consider . . . does not mean that it may not take into account any other
pertinent factor.”) (emphasis in original); see also Vargas-Davila, 649 F.3d at 132 (“Although
section 3583(e)(3) incorporates by reference, and thus encourages, consideration of certain
enumerated subsections of section 3553(a), it does not forbid consideration of other pertinent
section 3553(a) factors.”); Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400 (“[T]he fact that § 3583(e) does not require that
courts consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not mean that courts are forbidden to consider that factor . . . .”);
Williams, 443 F.3d at 47 (“[W]e interpret § 3583(e) simply as requiring consideration of the
enumerated subsections of § 3553(a), without forbidding consideration of other pertinent factors.”);
accord United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing circuit split to reject
defendant’s argument on plain error that sentencing judge improperly considered retribution, while
noting that “[t]he text of § 3583(e) does not . . . explicitly forbid a district court from considering
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)”) (emphasis in original).
166. Young, 634 F.3d at 240.
167. Id. at 239, 241 n.3 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(B), 3553(a)(2)(C)); see also
Clay, 752 F.3d at 1108 (“[T]here is significant overlap between these factors and
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) . . . .”); Williams, 443 F.3d at 48 (“[W]e cannot see how, in order to impose a
sentence that will provide ‘adequate deterrence,’ . . . and protection of the public from ‘further crimes
of the defendant,’ . . . in light of ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense,’ the court could possibly
ignore the seriousness of the offense.”).
168. Young, 634 F.3d at 239 (quoting Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400).
169. Id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir.2007)).
170. Id. at 239 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
171. Williams, 443 F.3d at 48.
172. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. App’x § 3(b)); see also Young, 634 F.3d at 241
(“[T]he primary purpose of a sentence for the violation of supervised release is ‘to sanction the
defendant’s breach of trust.’”).
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By contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits read § 3583(e)(3) to
exclude retribution as justifying supervised release, yet still permit judges
to consider it.173 The Ninth Circuit, for example, called it “improper” to
consider retribution, given that “§ 3553(a)(2)(A) is a factor that Congress
deliberately omitted from the list applicable to revocation sentencing.”174
Yet the court ultimately held that judges were only prohibited from
placing “primary” reliance on retribution, and emphasized that “a mere
reference to promoting respect for the law” is not “in
itself . . . unreasonable.”175
The circuit courts are unanimous that judges may consider retribution
when revoking supervised release, with only minor disagreement about
the weight they may place on it. Although § 3583(e)(3) omits retribution
as a factor, the circuit courts have followed the Sentencing Commission
and the Supreme Court in promoting a retributive theory of revocation.
II.

SUPERVISED RELEASE: STRUCTURE, STATUTE, AND
PURPOSE

The retributive theory of revocation contradicts the structure, statute,
and purpose of supervised release. First, the structure of conditional
liberty under supervised release involves no act of “trust” by the
government, so there is nothing for defendants to “breach.” Second, the
statute deliberately excludes retribution from the list of factors to consider
when revoking supervised release. Finally, the purpose of supervised
release is to safely transition prisoners back to the community, not punish
them for misconduct. Rather than seek retribution, judges should revoke
supervised release purely for utilitarian purposes.

173. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006).
174. Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1182.
175. Id.; see also United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The seriousness
of the offense underlying the revocation, though not a focal point of the inquiry, may be considered
to a lesser degree as part of the criminal history of the violator.”); United States v. Webb 738 F.3d
638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A]lthough a district court may not impose a revocation sentence based
predominately on the seriousness of the releasee’s violation or the need for the sentence to promote
respect for the law and provide just punishment, we conclude that mere reference to such
considerations does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors
are relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.”); United States
v. Rivera, 797 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Our opinion holds only that ‘making the seriousness
of the [offense constituting the supervised release violation] and the need for just punishment
dominant factors in [the] revocation sentence’ was error. Determining precisely to what extent a
district court may rely on the ‘seriousness of the offense’ in applying the other section 3583(e) factors,
e.g., the ‘nature and circumstances of the offense,’ and the Guidelines is an issue left unaddressed by
our opinion, and it is best left to future cases.”).
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Structure of Conditional Liberty

Because supervised release involves no act of “trust” by the
government, there is nothing for defendants to “breach.” Violating a
condition of supervised release may be undesirable or even harmful, but
it does not betray any promise by the defendant. While the Sentencing
Commission intended the “breach of trust” concept to distinguish between
offense sentencing and revocation sentencing, courts have misinterpreted
its language as suggesting an independent retributive basis for revocation.
1.

Supervised Release Is Not Probation

The “breach of trust” concept originated in the Sentencing
Commission’s initial decision to address revocation of probation and
supervised release together in a “single set of policy statements.”176 The
Commissioners acknowledged “considerable debate” about this choice,
yet ultimately concluded that the sentences shared the same “purpose” of
“integrati[ng] . . . the
violator
into
the
community,
while
providing . . . supervision . . . to limit further criminal conduct”177 making
“violations of the conditions of probation and supervised
release . . . functionally equivalent.”178
Combining probation and supervised release revocations was a
mistake. Whether or not these sentences share the same “purpose” or
“function[],” they are structurally distinct.179 Probation is conditional
liberty granted in lieu of imprisonment, while supervised release is
conditional liberty imposed in addition to a prison sentence. Therefore,
probation involves an act of “trust” by the government, while supervised
release does not.
Probation is “an alternative to incarceration,”180 which is “conferred as
a privilege . . . a matter of favor,” not “a right.”181 Much like a parolee, a
probationer is spared imprisonment “based on an evaluation that he shows
reasonable promise of being able to return to society and function as a
responsible, self-reliant person.”182 And just like releasing a parolee,
sentencing a defendant to probation involves “a risk that [the probationer]
will not be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
2018).
181.
182.

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1990).
Id.
Id. § 7B.
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 7A3(b), 7B1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. B, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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acts.”183 Because probation is “an act of grace,” it “may be coupled
with . . . conditions in respect of its duration.”184
There is no grace in supervised release.185 Supervised release runs after
the prison sentence, which the defendant must serve in full.186 The
government does not take a risk by granting the defendant supervised
release, but rather imposes it to “facilitate the reintegration of the
defendant into the community.”187 Supervised release extends the
defendant’s sentence rather than reducing it, as Judge Posner said:
“Supervised release does not shorten prison time; instead it imposes
restrictions on the prisoner to take effect upon his release from prison.
Parole [and probation] mitigates punishment; supervised release
augments it.”188 In Haymond, Justice Gorsuch emphasized a similar
“structural difference” between parole and supervised release,189 because
“‘[u]nlike parole,’ supervised release wasn’t introduced to replace a
portion of the defendant’s prison term,” but rather comes “after the
completion of his prison term.”190 The same distinction holds between
probation and supervised release.
2.

Violations Do Not Breach Trust

Because supervised release adds to prison time rather than replacing it,
a violation of supervised release does not “breach” any “trust” placed in
the defendant.191 A violation of supervised release may be harmful or
socially undesirable, but the defendant has not betrayed any promise to
obey the conditions. While the Sentencing Commission adopted the
“breach of trust” concept to distinguish between offense sentencing and
183. See id. at 483.
184. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492–93 (1935).
185. After defendants complete one year of supervised release, they may petition the court to
terminate their supervision early. See 18 U.S.C § 3583(e)(1). This action, arguably, is a reward for
good behavior that involves an “act of grace.” Escoe, 295 U.S. at 492. Unlike probation or parole,
however, early termination does not justify conditions of release, but rather ends them. Furthermore,
early termination is rarely granted, see Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra
note 118, at 35, and defendants who sign plea agreements with appellate waivers may not seek it. See
United States v. Damon, 933 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2019).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
187. United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5D1.1 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1992)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
188. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2015).
189. United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2019) (plurality opinion).
190. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A2(b) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2012)). For a constitutional analysis of this difference between supervised release and
parole, see generally Schuman, supra note 82.
191. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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revocation sentencing, its use of backwards-looking, moral language
inaccurately suggests an independent retributive basis for revoking
supervised release.
Violating a condition of probation is arguably a breach of trust and
moral wrong. By sentencing a defendant to probation, the government
trusts in the “promise” that they will “return to society and function as a
responsible, self-reliant person.”192 The scope of this trust is expressed in
the conditions of probation, which the defendant must obey in exchange
for being spared a term of imprisonment.193 Therefore, if a defendant
violates a condition of probation, they break the trust placed in them by
allowing them to avoid imprisonment.
Of course, this benevolent description does not always reflect reality.
Defendants sentenced to probation often face a stark power disparity with
the government, making supervision more a matter of coercion than
consent.194 But whether the defendant’s promise to obey is explicit or
implicit, compelled or free, the structure of probation still involves an act
of government “risk” or “grace” in granting the defendant supervision
instead of imprisonment.195 This structure at least arguably justifies
revocation as punishment for the defendant’s breach of trust.
Supervised release, by contrast, involves no act of trust by the
government. Instead, supervised release is the opposite of trust—
additional supervision to follow full service of the prison term. The
supervision is not “granted” as an alternative to imprisonment, but rather
imposed by the judge at sentencing to follow the defendant’s prison
sentence.196 Defendants make no “promise” to obey the conditions of
release, and the government engages in no act of “risk” or “grace” by
sentencing them to supervision.197 Violating a condition of supervised
release might be misguided and even harmful, and sanctions may well be
warranted for reasons of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. But
violations of supervised release do not “breach” any “trust” that would

192. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3563.
194. See Travis, supra note 51, at 640 (arguing that probation and parole are not an act of mercy or
trust but rather “a form of state regulation of deviant subgroups in our society, with significant racially
disparate consequences”).
195. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483; Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492–93 (1935).
196. Judges impose supervised release in 99% of eligible cases, which include felonies and grade
A misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra
note 118, at 7. Supervised release is also mandatory for certain offenses, such as drug-trafficking
crimes. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 859(b), 860(a)–(b), 960(b) (manufacturing, distributing, or
possessing with intent to distribute above certain quantities; distributing to persons under twenty-one;
distributing or manufacturing in or near schools and colleges).
197. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483; Escoe, 295 U.S. at 492–93.

Schuman (Do Not Delete)

908

10/11/2021 3:55 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:881

justify retributive punishment.
In fact, the name “supervised release” is itself a misnomer. Defendants
on supervised release are not released from anything, but rather subject to
additional supervision after their prison terms.198 The word “revocation”
is also misleading. As Judge Weinstein has explained, because supervised
release grants defendants nothing, there is nothing for judges to revoke:
Parole was based on early release from prison—by the grace of
the parole board a person was conditionally released from prison,
and the leniency could be ‘revoked.’ A person on supervised
release has completed his or her prison term and is serving an
independent term of supervision separately ordered by the court.
Supervised release is not being ‘revoked’; rather, a supervisee is
being punished for violating conditions.199
Justice Kavanaugh made a similar observation at the Haymond oral
argument: “Revocation of parole seems to me . . . like a denied benefit,
whereas revocation of supervised release seems like a penalty.”200
Justice Alito offered a possible counter-argument to this position in his
Haymond dissent when he suggested that sentencing judges shortened
prison terms in exchange for imposing supervised release.201 In that case,
the imposition of supervised release instead of imprisonment would
arguably be an act of trust, offering a retributive basis for revocation. Yet
neither the statute nor the Guidelines require judges to make this tradeoff, and the empirical data does not suggest judges engage in it. Instead,
judges impose supervised release on virtually all eligible defendants,202
with both the average prison sentence and the number of people under
supervision rising dramatically since 1984.203 In many cases, mandatory
198. As an alternative, Fiona Doherty has suggested the term “conditional release.” Doherty, supra
note 101, at 961. This name is an improvement, yet still inaccurately suggests that defendants have
been granted “release” from prison subject to certain “conditions,” when in reality, they have
completed their full prison sentences and now must serve additional supervision in the community. A
better name for supervised release would be “restricted liberty,” or “conditional supervision.”
199. United States v. Trotter, 321 F. Supp. 3d 337, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
200. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369
(2019) (No. 17-1672).
201. See United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2390 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
202. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised
Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 206 (2013) (finding “supervised release was almost never
contested at sentencing. . . . neither discussed by judges at the sentencing hearing, nor mentioned by
the parties in sentencing submissions”).
203. See United States v. Portillo, 981 F.3d 181, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The average time served
by all federal prisoners in 1986, the year before the repeal of parole became effective, was 14.6
months; in 2012, it was 37.5 months.”); Jacob Schuman, America’s Shadow Criminal Justice System,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148592/americas-shadow-
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minimum terms of both imprisonment and supervision make it impossible
for judges to reduce one penalty in favor of the other.204 Because judges
typically do not reduce prison sentences in exchange for supervised
release, violations cannot generally be considered a “breach of trust.”205
3.

Courts Have Misinterpreted the Guidelines

Although violations of supervised release do not breach any trust, the
“breach of trust” concept still expresses an important distinction in
revocation sentencing. When the Commission described violations as a
“breach of trust,” it was distinguishing between punishing a defendant for
criminal conduct and punishing a defendant for violating a condition of
supervision. Unfortunately, courts have misinterpreted this language as
instead providing an independent retributive basis for revoking supervised
release.
The Guidelines use the “breach of trust” concept to distinguish between
punishing criminal conduct and punishing a violation of supervision.206
That distinction is important because one-third of all revocations involve
defendants who have committed new crimes while under supervision.207
When this happens, the defendant will face two separate proceedings:
first, a prosecution for the criminal offense, resulting in a conviction and

criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/Z2MU-PA57] (explaining that since 1984, “the number of
people under supervision has increased five-fold”); see also Prison Time Surges for Federal Inmates,
PEW TRUSTS (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates#:~:text=The%20average%20length%20of%
20time,offenses%E2%80%94imprisonment%20periods%20increased%20significantly
[https://perma.cc/9A4Z-J4UP].
204. The parties may privately agree to trade supervision for imprisonment in plea negotiations,
but the final decision is up to the judge. See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he conditions recommended to the judge at the sentencing hearing may be a product of
negotiation between prosecution and defense. The defendant’s lawyer may offer the prosecution a
trade—more supervised release for a reduced prison term—and the prosecutor may agree. And when
adversaries agree on the outcome of a legal proceeding the sentencing judge, habituated as American
judges are to adversary procedure, may be reluctant to subject the agreement to critical scrutiny.”).
205. Intriguingly, the Sentencing Guidelines do recommend that judges should punish violations
of supervised release more harshly if the defendant’s “original sentence was the result of a downward
departure . . . or a charge reduction that resulted in a sentence below the guideline range applicable to
the defendant’s underlying conduct.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.4 cmt. n.4 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2018). This enhancement could be justified on the ground that the original, lenient
prison sentence was an act of trust, and the violation of supervised release more culpable for betraying
that trust. But because defendants do not usually receive downward departures or charge reductions
resulting in a sentence below the guideline range, it does not apply in most cases.
206. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
207. See Table E-7A, supra note 122.
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prison sentence, and second, a revocation proceeding for the violation,208
resulting in a revocation and yet another prison sentence.
In these cases, the Guidelines instruct that judges should not punish the
defendant “as if [the] conduct were being sentenced as new federal
criminal conduct,” but rather “for failing to abide by the conditions of the
court-ordered supervision.”209 In other words, the Guidelines say that
judges should “not . . . punish a defendant’s violation as if it were a new
federal crime, but rather . . . sanction the defendant’s breach of the court’s
trust—that is, his or her failure to comply with court-ordered conditions
arising from the original conviction.”210
The Commission distinguished between punishing a “new federal
crime” and a “breach of trust” for practical reasons.211 “Given the
relatively narrow ranges of incarceration available” and the “difficulty in
obtaining [the] information necessary” at revocation hearings, it would be
hard to apply a “detailed revocation guideline system” equivalent to the
“offense guidelines” that govern “initial sentencing.”212 Furthermore,
when a defendant is found in violation of supervision based on a new
conviction, the “breach of trust” concept is necessary to justify a
consecutive revocation sentence. Otherwise, the “revocation court” would
“substantially duplicate the sanctioning role of the court with jurisdiction
over . . . [the] new criminal conduct,” and the revocation sentence would
have “to run concurrently.”213
The Commission’s distinction between punishing a crime versus
punishing a violation is “subtle indeed.”214 Yet the difference has become
critical in defining the scope of defendants’ constitutional rights. In his
Haymond concurrence, Justice Breyer voted to strike down the five-year
mandatory-minimum revocation sentence because its severity and
selective application to sex offenses made it less like “ordinary
revocation,” which “sanctions . . . the defendant’s ‘breach of trust,’” and
more like “punishment for a new offense, to which the jury right would
208. By statute, every term of supervised release must include a condition requiring that “the
defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
209. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
210. United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1162 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2386 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
211. See id.
212. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
213. Id.
214. United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Rivera,
797 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2015) (calling the distinction “a (very) fine line”); Paula Kei Biderman &
Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G. REP.
204, 206 (1994) (“There is no real distinction between what the Commission calls the ‘breach of trust’
and the ‘seriousness of the underlying violation.’”).
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typically attach.”215 According to this opinion, a revocation sentence that
targets the defendant’s underlying conduct violates the jury right.
While the Commission intended to distinguish between the bases for
revoking supervision, courts have also misinterpreted the “breach of trust”
concept as providing an independent retributive basis for revoking
supervised release. The phrase is misleadingly retributive in two respects.
First, it focuses on the defendant’s past conduct, rather than the
consequences of revocation. Second, it uses moral terminology suggesting
that violations of supervised release are intrinsically blameworthy and
deserving of punishment. Justice Alito made this mistake in his Haymond
dissent, asserting that “[t]he principal reason for assigning a penalty to a
supervised-release violation . . . is that the violative act is a breach of
trust.”216 The Sixth Circuit made the same error, saying that “revocation
sentences are . . . intended to ‘sanction,’ or, analogously, to ‘provide just
punishment for the offense’ of violating supervised release.”217
Using the “breach of trust” concept to justify retributive revocation
misunderstands the structure of conditional liberty under supervised
release. Unlike probation, supervised release involves no act of risk or
grace by the government, so there is no trust for the defendant to breach.
Courts might revoke supervision to discourage violations or protect the
public but have no independent justification for punishing the defendant’s
“breach of trust.” Instead, the Commission intended the “breach of trust”
concept to distinguish between sentencing criminal conduct and
sentencing a violation of supervision. The Commission never meant to
suggest that violating supervised release deserved retributive punishment.
B.

Statutory Language

The plain language of the Sentencing Reform Act forbids judges from
considering retribution when revoking supervised release. The key
provision is 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which enumerates eight factors for
judges to consider, but omits 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), the retributive
theory of punishment. The best reading of this language is that judges
215. United States v. Haymond, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2386 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)). Justice Alito
applied similar reasoning but reached the opposite conclusion, saying that revocation of release never
requires a jury because it punishes the defendant’s “‘breach of trust,’ not ‘new criminal conduct.’” Id.
at 2393 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018)).
216. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
217. United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)); see
also United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1109 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding reference to “just
punishment” at a revocation hearing “appropriately describe[d] a sanction that conveys the
importance of obeying conditions of supervised release”).
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must ignore retribution as a factor in revocation decisions.
1.

Section 3583(e)(3) Omits Retribution

Section 3583(e)(3) lists eight factors for judges to consider when
revoking supervised release. Those include the three utilitarian purposes
of punishment—(1) deterrence, (2) incapacitation, and (3) rehabilitation,
as well as five other factors—(4) the characteristics of the offense and the
offender, (5) the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommended sentence, (6) the
Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements, (7) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (8) the need to provide restitution
to any victims.218 By omitting the fourth purpose of punishment—
retribution—§ 3583(e)(3) prohibits judges from considering retribution
when revoking supervised release.
According to the “ancient” canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,219 a statute “expressing one item of [an] associated group or
series excludes another left unmentioned.”220 In other words, “[i]f a sign
at the entrance to a zoo says ‘come see the elephant, lion, hippo, and
giraffe,’ and a temporary sign is added saying ‘the giraffe is sick,’ you
would reasonably assume that the others are in good health.”221 While this
rule “does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping,” it does carry
“force . . . when the items expressed are members of an ‘associated group
or series,’ justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded
by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”222 For example, the Supreme
Court applied the expressio unius canon in holding that a statute’s
particularity requirement for all pleadings alleging “fraud or mistake”
necessarily excluded any particularity requirement for other forms of
action.223
Section 3583(e)(3) is a classic example of where the expressio unius
canon should apply. The provision enumerates a series of eight associated
sentencing factors for consideration, all from § 3553(a): “[t]he court may,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) . . . revoke a term of

218. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (cross-referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D)).
219. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
220. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 929, 933 (2017) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002)).
221. Id.
222. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535
U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
223. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
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supervised release.”224 This list includes three of the four “purposes” of
punishment.225 The only purpose not listed is § 3553(a)(2)(A), retribution.
The expressio unius canon strongly suggests that it was “excluded by
deliberate choice.”226
The force of the expressio unius canon is especially strong here,
“[w]here Congress include[d] particular language in one section of a
statute but omit[ted] it in another section of the same Act.”227 The
Sentencing Reform Act lists retribution as a factor when judges impose
other kinds of sentences, such as fines or imprisonment for criminal
convictions,228 but not when judges revoke supervised release. The best
interpretation is that judges may not revoke supervised release for
retributive reasons.
The deliberate exclusion of retribution finds additional support in
§ 3583(e)(3)’s omission of one other factor from the list of considerations:
§ 3553(a)(3), the “kinds of sentences available.” While there is no
legislative history explaining this omission, it appears intentional and
even quite thoughtful. The actions authorized under § 3583(e) present the
judge with limited sentencing options: terminating supervised release
(which ends supervision), modifying supervised release or imposing
house arrest (which changes the conditions), and revoking supervised
release (which sends the defendant back to prison).229 For each of these
actions, there are no other “kinds of sentences available,” and thus no
reason to consider § 3553(a)(3).230 Just as the statute is careful to exclude
this unnecessary factor from revocation decisions, it also is deliberate in
omitting the retributive theory of punishment.
2.

Section 3553(a)(2)(A) Is a Distinctive Theory
Despite § 3583(e)(3)’s omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) as a consideration,

224. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Those eight factors are: § 3553(a)(1), the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D), the need for the
sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; § 3553(a)(4), the
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; § 3553(a)(5), any
pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; § 3553(a)(6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities; and § 3553(a)(7), the need to provide restitution to any victims.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
226. Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168.
227. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a); id. § 3582(a).
229. See id. § 3583(e)(1)–(4).
230. 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3).
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a majority of circuit courts hold that retribution is “inextricably
intertwined”231 or “essentially redundant”232 with other factors judges
must consider when revoking supervised release. That interpretation,
however, misinterprets the language of § 3553(a)(2)(A), which justifies
punishment “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”233 Unlike the
utilitarian theories in the Sentencing Reform Act, this provision expresses
a distinctively non-consequentialist theory of punishment that judges can
exclude from revocation decisions.
The Sentencing Reform Act lists four “purposes” of punishment in four
different subsections: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.234 By assigning each purpose to a distinct subsection, the
Act allows other parts of the law to selectively cross-reference these
provisions in order to vary the justifications for the various kinds of
sentences, such as imprisonment, supervised release, etc.235 Reading
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) as redundant with the other purposes undermines this
careful statutory design.
Read closely, each of the three clauses in § 3553(a)(2)(A) conveys a
non-consequentialist theory of punishment, distinct from the utilitarian
justifications in the other subsections. While the circuit courts in
revocation cases have conflated § 3553(a)(2)(A) with the other factors,
the provision describes a uniquely retributive theory of punishment that
judges are capable of excluding when revoking supervised release.
“[T]o reflect the seriousness of the offense . . . .”236 This is backwardslooking, retributive language that describes punishment as justified based
on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. The circuit courts,
however, claim they “cannot see how” a judge “could possibly ignore the
seriousness of the offense” when “impos[ing] a [revocation] sentence that
will provide ‘adequate deterrence,’ and protection of the public from
‘further crimes of the defendant.’”237 The error in their reading is that
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) does not express a measure of the severity of the
231. United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 239, 241 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C)); see also United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1109 (7th Cir.
2014); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2006).
232. Young, 634 F.3d at 239 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007)).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
234. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011).
235. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582, 3583, 3586.
236. 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
237. United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C)); see also United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1108 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he ‘nature’ of a violation includes its ‘seriousness.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A))); Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400; Young, 634 F.3d at 239.
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defendant’s conduct, but rather a substantive basis for imposing
punishment. Judges can exclude the “seriousness” of the violation from
their consideration when revoking supervised release by assessing the
severity of the defendant’s misconduct in deciding what sentence is
warranted to deter and incapacitate while excluding the blameworthiness
of the violation as an independent reason for revocation.238 In other words,
judges can consider the gravity of the violation when weighing the
utilitarian factors, but not as a standalone retributive basis for the
punishment.
“[T]o promote respect for the law . . . .”239 This clause also takes a
retributive view of sentencing, describing punishment as an assertion of
the law’s authority in the face of a transgression. The circuit courts,
however, have missed the “mystic” import of this language in revocation
cases,240 conflating it with the need for deterrence and rehabilitation. They
assert that “‘promot[ing] respect for the law’ is a means of deterring future
violations,”241 and “help[ing]” defendants by teaching them “to obey the
conditions of . . . supervised release.”242 These readings, however,
overlook the retributive message in the provision—that promoting respect
for the legal system is good for its own sake. Judges can exclude this
consideration by revoking supervised release solely to deter and
rehabilitate, and not punishing simply to vindicate the authority of the law.
“[A]nd to provide just punishment for the offense.”243 Finally, this
clause expresses the retributive philosophy that punishment is a way to
restore equilibrium after an individual violates the basic rules of the
community.244 Yet while the circuit courts acknowledge that violations of
supervised release “generally do not entail conduct as serious as crimes,”
they nevertheless hold that “revocation sentences are similarly intended
to ‘sanction,’ or, analogously, to ‘provide just punishment for the offense’
of violating supervised release.”245 This conflation of supervision
violations and criminal offenses does not withstand scrutiny, however, as
238. See United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2017) (distinguishing between
sentencing a defendant based on the “seriousness of the offense per se,” and “the risk to the public
that the seriousness of the defendant’s offense suggested”).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
240. HOLMES, supra note 69, at 42.
241. Clay, 752 F.3d at 1109 (quoting United States v. Vargas-Davila, 649 F.3d 129, 131–32 (1st
Cir. 2011)).
242. United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2007)).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
244. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 476–79 (1968).
245. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400; see also Clay, 752 F.3d at 1109 (referencing “just punishment” at a
revocation hearing “appropriately describe[d] a sanction that conveys the importance of obeying
conditions of supervised release”).
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violations do not break generally applicable laws and may include entirely
non-criminal conduct.246 Indeed, the plain language of § 3553(a)(2)(A)
suggests that only conduct serious enough to be a criminal “offense”
merits “just punishment.”247 Judges can exclude this consideration when
revoking supervised release by focusing solely on the consequences of the
revocation, and not any inherent justice in punishment.
3.

Section 3583(e)(3) Is a Rule of Exclusion

Finally, to serve any purpose, § 3583(e)(3)’s list of factors to consider
when revoking supervised release must exclude the omitted factors from
consideration. If the list is merely inclusive—requiring judges to consider
the enumerated factors but not excluding others—then it has no function,
because judges are not required to make express findings on the factors
they do consider. If the list serves to exclude, by contrast, then it provides
a way for reviewing courts to identify errors when judges revoke
supervised release based on an improper factor. While a majority of circuit
courts have held § 3583(e)(3) to be a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion,248 these interpretations render the list surplusage, which is not
the best reading.
The Sentencing Reform Act requires district judges to explain the
reasons for their sentences on the record, but this rule amounts to very
little in practice.249 Sentencing explanations can be “brief,” and need only
“set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [the judge] has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising
his own legal decision-making authority.”250 There is “no requirement that
the district court recite every section 3553(a) factor,”251 so long as the
judge “give[s] an adequate statement of reasons.”252 In other words, the

246. Approximately half of all violations are for non-criminal conduct. See Schuman, supra note
82, at 629 n.291.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
248. See United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2011).
249. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), (c).
250. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
251. United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Kirby,
418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The court need not recite the[] factors [listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)] but must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in order to allow for
reasonable appellate review.”).
252. United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States
v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We do not require ‘a ritualistic incantation to
establish consideration of a legal issue,’ nor do we demand that the district court ‘recite any magic
words’ to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has
instructed it to consider.” (quoting United States v. McCellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999))).
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“duty ‘to consider’ the statutory factors is not a duty to make findings.”253
Even if the judge does “not discuss the § 3553(a) factors,”254 reviewing
courts will “defer to ‘the district court’s sentence as long as the court has
provided a plausible explanation, and the overall result is defensible.”255
The same rule applies when judges revoke supervised release,256
meaning that a judge can revoke supervised release without discussing the
§ 3553(a) factors. Because the judge need not mention the listed factors
in explaining the revocation decision, § 3583(e)(3)’s list of considerations
serves no purpose unless it excludes the unlisted factors from
consideration. If § 3583(e)(3) is merely a rule of inclusion, then it is a
dead letter, because the judge can revoke supervision without making any
express findings on those factors.257 The only way § 3583(e)(3) has any
practical effect is if it excludes the omitted factors from consideration,
allowing a reviewing court to determine if the judge violated the statute
by relying on a prohibited consideration. The best reading of § 3583(e)(3)
is that by excluding retribution as a factor, it forbids judges from revoking
supervised release for that reason.258
253. United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)). Circuit courts allow judges this “shortcut” around the § 3553(a) factors because
express consideration would “doubl[e] the amount of work involved in sentencing.” Id.; see also
United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (“When the defendant has not
raised any substantial contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and the district court
imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range,” the court need not “explain on the record how the
§ 3553(a) factors justify the sentence.”); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states
for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”).
254. United States v. Sainz-Preciado, 566 F.3d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 2009).
255. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006)). In Ofray-Campos, the district court judge sentenced the
defendant to 200 months in prison for his role in a drug-dealing conspiracy, explaining the sentence
as follows: “The court notes that the defendant[’]s substantial participation in furtherance of an
extensive and violent drug trafficking enterprise and its detrimental consequences to society, which
[sic] warrants a sentence at the middle of the guideline range.” Id. On appeal, the First Circuit found
this explanation sufficient, as there was “no indication that the district court failed to consider, or
accord sufficient weight, to the relevant sentencing factors.” Id.
256. United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.
Michael, 909 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2018) (“We do not require a district court to mechanically list
every § 3553(a) consideration when sentencing a defendant upon revocation of supervised release.”
(quoting United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824–25 (8th Cir. 2009))).
257. Alternatively, the courts may have misinterpreted the Sentencing Reform Act. If Congress
intended to require sentencing judges to make express findings on every § 3553(a) factor, then
§ 3583(e) could plausibly function as either a rule of inclusion or exclusion. Given the current state
of the law, however, the only way to ensure § 3583(e) is not superfluous is by reading it as a rule of
exclusion.
258. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2001) (explaining it is “a cardinal principle of
statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
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The Supreme Court applied a similar approach in Tapia v. United
States,259 which interpreted a provision of the Sentencing Reform Act,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), stating the factors to be considered when
judges impose a prison sentence.260 The provision states that judges
should “consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that
they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”261 The Court read this
language to forbid judges from considering rehabilitation when
sentencing a defendant to imprisonment,262 rejecting the argument that
this instruction was merely a “reminder . . . a kind of loosey-goosey
caution not to put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to
rehabilitate.”263 “[T]he drafters . . . could have used still more
commanding language,” the Court acknowledged, but “Congress
expressed itself clearly . . . even if armchair legislators might come up
with something even better.”264
Although § 3583(e)(3) uses different language than § 3582(a), its
meaning is equally clear. Just like § 3582(a) instructed judges imposing a
prison sentence to consider all the § 3553(a) factors except rehabilitation,
§ 3583(e)(3) tells judges revoking supervised release to consider a list of
§ 3553(a) factors, omitting retribution. Just as Tapia held that judges may
not rely on rehabilitation as a justification for imprisonment, so too judges
must exclude retribution when revoking supervised release.
To be sure, § 3583(e)(3) might have been phrased more clearly. In
addition to listing eight sentencing factors and omitting retribution,
Congress could also have expressly stated that district judges must not
consider retribution when revoking supervised release. But just like in
Tapia, demanding such a high degree of clarity is not the most natural
reading of the statute.265 By enumerating the factors to consider and
omitting § 3553(a)(2)(A), § 3583(e)(3) prohibits judges from considering
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant” and courts have
a “duty to ‘give each word some operative effect’ where possible”) (first quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000); then quoting Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 1010 U.S. 112, 115 (1879); and then
quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997)). Courts may consider words
as surplusage if they appear “inadvertently inserted” or are “repugnant to the rest of the statute,”
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (quoting K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION 525 (1960)), but that is not the case here.
259. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011).
260. Id.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis added).
262. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 327.
263. Id. (emphasis in original).
264. Id. at 327–28.
265. Id.
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retribution when revoking supervised release.
C.

Purpose of Supervised Release

Finally, the retributive theory of revocation contradicts Congress’s
utilitarian purpose in creating supervised release. The legislative history
for the Sentencing Reform Act reflects a plan for a limited, humanitarian
program of transitional support to assist former prisoners returning to the
community. The addition of a revocation mechanism in 1986 made the
system more punitive, but the core justifications for that change were still
consequentialist rather than moral. The retributive theory of revocation is
inconsistent with this purely utilitarian design.
1.

Imposition of Supervised Release Is Utilitarian

Congress created supervised release with a utilitarian purpose.
Lawmakers expressly rejected any retributive justification for imposing a
term of post-release supervision and envisioned the system as a way to
provide transitional services to defendants who needed help returning to
the community.266 Based on the legislative history and the statutory
language, the circuit courts have held judges may not impose supervised
release for retribution. The same conclusion should apply to revocation.
The Senate Report for the Sentencing Reform Act states that the
“primary goal” of supervised release is “to ease the defendant’s transition
into the community.”267 Supervision should not be imposed for
“punishment,” which “will have been served to the extent necessary by
the term of imprisonment.”268 By way of example, the Report suggests
supervised release for a defendant serving “a long prison term for a
particularly serious offense,” or “who has spent a fairly short period in
prison . . . but still needs supervision and training programs after
release.”269 The “evident congressional purpose” of this system is “to
improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty.”270
Reflecting that humanitarian ideal, the Sentencing Reform Act omits
266. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124–25 (1983) (“The committee has concluded that the sentencing
purpose[] of . . . punishment would not be served by a term of supervised release . . . . The term of
supervised release . . . may not be imposed for purposes of punishment.”).
267. Id. at 124.
268. Id. at 125. The Report also states that supervised release is not intended to incapacitate the
defendant, and the Act did not originally list incapacitation as a factor to be considered when imposing
supervised release. Id. at 124. Congress later added incapacitation as a factor in the Sentencing Act
of 1987. See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 9, 101 Stat. 1266, 1267 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)).
269. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983).
270. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708–09 (2000).
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retribution as a justification for imposing supervised release. In 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(c), the law lists eight factors to consider when imposing
supervised release, but excludes retribution: “The court, in determining
whether to include a term of supervised release . . . shall consider the
factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), and (a)(4)–(7).”271
The federal courts have held that § 3583(c)’s omission of
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) as a factor to be considered when imposing supervised
release forbids judges from considering retribution as justification for
supervision. The reason the provision omits retribution, they explain, is
that “supervised release is not, fundamentally, part of the punishment.”272
Instead, supervised release “fulfill[s] rehabilitative ends,”273 with “the
primary purpose . . . to facilitate the reentry of offenders into their
communities, rather than to inflict punishment.”274 The Supreme Court
has even cited § 3583(c) as an example of how the law limits the theories
of punishment justifying each kind of sentence: “[A] particular purpose
[of punishment] may apply differently, or even not at all, depending on
the kind of sentence under consideration. For example, a court may not
take account of retribution . . . when imposing a term of supervised
release.”275
While the circuit courts have drawn careful philosophical distinctions
between the retributive and utilitarian theories justifying imposition of
supervised release, they have failed to apply the identical distinction for
revocation of supervised release. In United States v. Burden,276 a district
judge sentenced a defendant to 365 months of imprisonment followed by
a lifetime of supervised release.277 Although the district judge “believed
[the defendant] was a ‘changed person,’” they imposed a lifetime of
supervision due to the “the seriousness of what [the defendant] did.”278
Finding the judge’s explanation “inflected with retributive interests,”

271. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). A separate subsection governs imposition of supervised release
following a revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Although this provision does not list factors
for the judge to consider in making that decision, courts apply the same considerations “listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(c).” United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 501 (3d Cir. 2013).
272. United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting United States
v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2015)).
273. Brooks, 889 F.3d at 99 (quoting Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59).
274. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2012)).
275. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011) (emphasis in original) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(c)); see also Murray, 692 F.3d at 280.
276. United States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2017).
277. Id. at 51.
278. Id. at 56.
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the Second Circuit held that “the supervised release term cannot stand.”279
Previously, in United States v. Williams,280 the court had held that judges
“may properly” consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised
release.281 However, the Burden court distinguished Williams because the
sentencing judge in Williams had “focused not on the seriousness of the
offense per se, but on the risk to the public that the seriousness of the
defendant’s offense suggested.”282 The judge in Burden, by contrast,
“repeatedly emphasized that [the] sentence was driven by the seriousness
of [the defendants’] crimes and that, though Burden had changed in the
intervening years, a long sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness
of Burden’s crimes.”283 Because the lifetime term of supervised release
appeared “to have been driven largely by the past seriousness of the
defendants’ crimes, standing alone,” the sentence was improperly
retributive.284
The list of factors for judges to consider when imposing supervised
release under § 3583(c) is identical to the list of factors for judges to
consider when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e)(3).285 Both
lists include all the utilitarian theories of punishment, but omit retribution.
Just as Burden found judges should exclude retribution as a factor when
they sentence a defendant to supervised release, so too should judges
exclude retribution when revoking supervised release.
2.

Revocation Is Punitive but Also Utilitarian

Congress’s decision in 1986 to authorize judges to revoke supervised
release for violations undoubtedly made the system more punitive.
Nevertheless, the legislative history for this change suggests that
lawmakers intended revocation to serve solely utilitarian goals of
deterrence and public safety, not retribution.
The original Sentencing Reform Act deliberately omitted any provision
279. Id.; see also United States v. Kopp, 922 F.3d 337, 340 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[A] judge may not
consider retribution when imposing a term of supervised release.”).
280. United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006).
281. Id. at 48.
282. Burden, 860 F.3d at 57.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. There is one small difference in the statutory language: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) says the court
“shall consider” the listed factors when imposing supervised release, while § 3583(e)(3) says the court
“may, after considering” the listed factors, revoke supervised release. This language does not appear
to make a difference as to whether the court may consider unlisted factors like retribution when
making the decision. Indeed, the Burden Court interpreted § 3583(c) to exclude retribution based
solely on its enumeration of factors, see 860 F.3d at 56, and in that respect, § 3583(e)(3) is
indistinguishable.
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for revoking supervised release, because lawmakers “d[id] not believe that
a minor violation of a condition of supervised release should result in
resentencing of the defendant.”286 Only if defendants engaged in “repeated
or serious violations of the conditions of supervised release” could they
be punished with “contempt of court” proceedings,287 which would
require a formal criminal prosecution affording full constitutional
protections.288
Just two years later, however, Congress voted to authorize judges to
revoke supervised release. While there is no recorded congressional
debate on this change,289 the Parole Commission and the federal judiciary
both advocated for the amendment, offering some insight into the reasons
behind its enactment.
First, Chairman Benjamin F. Baer of the Parole Commission asked
Congress to add a revocation mechanism “both to protect the community
and to aid the offender in his transition back to society.”290 Chairman Baer
criticized supervised release as “seriously flawed,” and argued that using
contempt of court to enforce release conditions was “cumbersome,
tax[ing] the limited resources of the courts . . . [and] ma[de] revocation
much more difficult.”291 More “expeditious[]” revocation was necessary,
he said, to “remove drug abusers from the streets before the drug habit
reaches the point that it can only be supported through criminal
activity.”292
Second, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, an
agency within the judicial branch that “provides . . . legislative, legal,
financial, technology, management, administrative, and program support
services to federal courts,”293 lobbied Congress to enact a revocation
mechanism to “streamline[]” the “procedure for enforcing the conditions
of supervised release.”294

286. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983).
287. Id.
288. See Doherty, supra note 101, at 999–1000.
289. The addition of a revocation mechanism did not even receive its own subheading, instead
being grouped with several minor alterations as “miscellaneous technical amendments.” Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1006, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-7.
290. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1986: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 99th
Cong. 64 (1985) (statement of Benjamin F. Baer, Chairman, U.S. Parole Comm’n) [hereinafter
Hearings].
291. Id. at 65–66.
292. Id. at 67–68.
293. Judicial Administration, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/judicialadministration [https://perma.cc/N7XG-VTVL].
294. 131 CONG. REC. 14,177 (1985).
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Empowering judges to revoke supervised clearly reflected a harsher
attitude toward crime. Yet the arguments put forward by the Parole
Commission and the Administrative Office still sounded in utilitarian
concerns of deterrence and incapacitation, without any suggestion that
violations should be punished as moral wrongs. Their goal was to use
revocation to promote compliance and public safety, not inflict
retribution. While this change made the system more coercive, it was still
consequentialist in design. Revocation was simply a more aggressive
approach to achieving the system’s original goal of ensuring a safe and
successful transition to the community.
3.

Retribution Contradicts Legislative Intent

Retributive revocation is contrary to the utilitarian intent behind
supervised release. While critics of the Sentencing Reform Act have
called it part of “a conceptual anti-movement,” whose “only clear
goals . . . were the repudiation of rehabilitation as the dominant theory of
punishment . . . ,”295 that appraisal is not quite fair when it comes to
supervised release. Congress may have been vague about the justifications
for imprisonment,296 but was clear and consistent in creating a purely
consequentialist system of post-release supervision, focused on
rehabilitation over retribution.
Far from an anti-movement, lawmakers designed supervised release
based on a deliberately utilitarian vision of community supervision. While
the Sentencing Reform Act rejected the rehabilitative theory of
imprisonment,297 Congress did not give up hope that defendants could be
rehabilitated outside prison. The legislative history makes clear that
supervised release was intended to promote “rehabilitation” in the form of
“supervision and training programs,”298 which would “fulfill[]
rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”299 Judges
would administer the supervision to “facilitate the reentry of offenders
into their communities, rather than to inflict punishment.”300 Indeed, the
drafters of the original statute so favored rehabilitation over retribution
that they did not even include a mechanism for punishing violations.
295. Douglas Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11 (2005).
296. See Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–8
(1987) (noting that the Act’s four purposes of punishment “often suggest different and sometimes
conflicting policies”).
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 320 (2011) (“§ 3582(a) tells
courts to acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation.”).
298. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983).
299. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000).
300. United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2012).
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Although the Probation Commission and Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts quickly persuaded Congress to authorize revocation for violations,
they still based their arguments on deterrence and public safety, not
retribution. Lawmakers appear to have realized that by replacing parole
with supervised release, they also had eliminated any retributive
justification for punishing violations.301 Without parole’s moral
foundation in “grace” and “trust,” revocation of supervised release had to
be justified by the consequences, such as encouraging the defendant to
follow the court’s conditions and protecting the community. While the
legislative history does not mention this distinction, the statute lists only
utilitarian theories of punishment as justifying revocation of supervised
release.302
Congress created supervised release to encourage a safe and successful
return to the community. Lawmakers intended that everything in the
system—from the imposition of conditions to the punishment of
violations—be limited to utilitarian purposes of deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Retributive revocation has no place in
this purely utilitarian design.
III. UTILITARIAN REVOCATION
A utilitarian approach to revocation would not just be a theoretical
change, but also have a significant practical impact by shortening prison
terms, mitigating implicit racial bias, and eliminating the justification for
consecutive revocation sentencing. The traditional story of criminal law
portrays courts as the branch of government most likely to defend
individuals against the state. Yet by promoting retributive revocation, the
federal judiciary played a key role in expanding the state’s power to
punish. While judges may feel a personal stake in sanctioning violators
for their disrespect, they should revoke supervised release based solely on
deterrence and incapacitation.
A.

Revoking to Deter and Incapacitate

Excluding retribution from revocation decisions would leave the
Sentencing Reform Act’s three remaining utilitarian “purposes” of
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But that is not
the end of the analysis. Under Tapia, the Act also rejects rehabilitation as
a justification for imprisonment, including when a judge imposes a

301. See supra section II.A.0
302. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
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sentence of imprisonment via revocation of supervised release.303 As a
result, there are only two factors judges should weigh when revoking
supervised release: deterrence and incapacitation. While it might seem
strange to consider just two theories of punishment, this approach aligns
well with the legislative history, which emphasized “deterren[ce]” and
“protect[ing] the community” as grounds for revocation,304 but never
retribution or rehabilitation.
What would a purely deterrent and incapacitative theory of revocation
look like? If a defendant were to commit technical violations but did not
seem likely to reoffend or pose a threat to the public (e.g., failing a drug
test, losing a job, or leaving the district without permission), then there
would be no justification for revoking supervised release, because there
would be no need for deterrence or incapacitation.305 By contrast, if a
defendant were to violate supervised release in a way that suggested a risk
of recidivism—for example, harassing a prior victim in breach of a nocontact order—then revocation might be appropriate to encourage
compliance and protect the public.
Under a purely utilitarian theory of revocation, reviewing courts would
vacate orders revoking supervised release if the trial judge were to
erroneously cite retribution as a factor. This approach finds support in
Tapia, where the Supreme Court held that a district judge violated the
Sentencing Reform Act by improperly considering rehabilitation in
imposing a prison sentence “to ensure that [the defendant] could complete
the 500 Hour Drug Program.”306 The Court remanded for the court of
303. The circuit courts unanimously hold that Tapia applies to revocation of supervised release.
See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 687 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Vandergrift, 754
F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 765–67 (6th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 657
(5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1041–42 (10th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir.
2012); United States v. Molignaro, 649 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d
276, 280 (9th Cir. 2011). Applying Tapia to revocation might seem strange, since § 3583(e)(3)
specifically lists rehabilitation as a factor to consider. However, the explanation lies in the statute’s
structure, which contains a single list of factors for judges to consider when taking four different
actions: (1) terminating supervised release, (2) extending or modifying supervised release,
(3) revoking supervised release, and (4) imposing house arrest. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(1)–(4). The
first, second, and fourth of these actions do not involve imprisonment, and therefore are consistent
with Tapia’s rule “not [to] think about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.” Tapia v. United
States, 564 U.S. 319, 330 (2011) (emphasis added). Revocation of supervised release, by contrast,
does involve imprisonment, and therefore must not be based on rehabilitation under Tapia. A judge
may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to modify the conditions or terminate supervision,
but not when deciding whether to revoke supervised release.
304. Hearings, supra note 290, at 64–66.
305. In some circumstances, violations like these might be warning signs of danger, but when they
were not, judges would not punish them with revocation.
306. Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334.
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appeals to consider whether the violation was plain error, which it
ultimately did, vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing.307
While § 3583(e)(3) uses different language than the provision in Tapia, it
performs the same function by eliminating a factor from consideration at
sentencing. The same remedy should therefore apply. If a judge were to
improperly revoke supervised release based on retribution, reviewing
courts would vacate and remand for resentencing.308
B.

Impact of Utilitarian Revocation

Adopting a purely utilitarian theory of revocation would not just be a
philosophical change. If judges ignored retribution and focused only on
deterrence and incapacitation, then they would also reduce prison terms,
mitigate implicit racial bias, and end the arbitrary and unfair practice of
consecutive revocation sentencing.
First, excluding retribution from the revocation analysis would lead
judges to impose shorter prison sentences for violations. If judges did not
consider retribution when revoking supervised release, then they would
have one less justification for imposing a prison term. Because they
currently place primary emphasis on retribution in revocation
proceedings,309 considering only deterrence and incapacitation could
significantly shorten prison sentences. The same dynamic occurred after
Tapia—when reviewing courts vacated prison sentences for improper
consideration of rehabilitation, the sentencing judge often imposed a
shorter sentence on remand.310 In the same way, removing retribution as
307. Id. at 334–35; see also United States v. Tapia, 665 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011). The circuit
courts have held that sentencing a defendant to imprisonment for rehabilitative reasons can be
reversible error. See United States v. Tidzump, 841 F.3d 844, 845 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Wooley, 740 F.3d 359, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Culbertson, 712 F.3d 235, 243–44
(5th Cir. 2013); Garza, 706 F.3d at 663; United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 548, 550 (5th Cir.
2012); United States v. Olson, 667 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2012); Mendiola, 696 F.3d at 1042; United
States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 425–26 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Taylor, 679 F.3d at 1007;
United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1107–08 (10th Cir. 2011); Grant, 664 F.3d at 279–82;
Molignaro, 649 F.3d at 4–5.
308. Abolishing the retributive theory of revocation would require the eight circuits that have
already ruled on this issue to revisit their precedents through an en banc proceeding. By contrast, the
four circuit courts that have not yet addressed retributive revocation—specifically, the Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—would not have that problem, and should follow the structure, statute,
and purpose of supervised release in adopting a purely utilitarian approach to revocation.
309. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
310. See, e.g., Wooley, 740 F.3d at 365–66 (applying Tapia to vacate thirty-month sentence);
Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3, United States v. Wooley, No. 08-136 “B” (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 2014)
(imposing twenty-five-month sentence on remand); Broussard, 669 F.3d at 553 (applying Tapia to
vacate forty-year sentence); Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Broussard,
6:10-CR-00217-001 (W.D. La. Mar. 12, 2013) (imposing twenty-year sentence on remand);
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a factor in revocation decisions would likely lead judges to impose to
shorter prison terms.
Defense advocates might worry that excluding the retributive theory of
punishment could actually increase revocation sentences by empowering
judges to revoke release without considering the seriousness of the
violation. In other words, judges might impose longer sentences for minor
violations based on purely utilitarian concerns like public safety.
Yet that worst-case scenario is improbable, as it depends on a theory of
“limiting retributivism” that federal sentencing law does not adopt.311
Limiting retributivism holds that retribution sets “outer limits on
permissible punishments,” while “utilitarian goals . . . operate within
those limits.”312 According to this logic, if retributivism limits
punishment, then excluding it could lead judges to impose longer
revocation sentences. However, that outcome is unlikely, as the
Sentencing Reform Act does not limit punishment based on retribution.313
Instead, the Act caps sentences through a more general “parsimony
principle,”314 which instructs judges to impose punishment “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes [of punishment]
set forth in [the Act].”315 Under the parsimony principle, excluding
Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d at 423–24 (applying Tapia to vacate sixty-month sentence); Amended
Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 5:11CR00152-001 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 1, 2012) (imposing thirty-five-month sentence on remand); Cordery, 656 F.3d at 1106 (applying
Tapia to vacate fifty-six-month sentence); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Cordery,
No. DUTX2:08CR000467-001-CW (D. Utah. Nov. 4, 2011) (imposing forty-five-month sentence on
remand).
311. Berman, supra note 295, at 48.
312. Id.
313. Paul Hofer and Mark Allenbaugh have argued that the Sentencing Guidelines endorse a form
of limiting retributivism by tying the offense levels used to calculate the recommended sentencing
range to the specifics of the defendant’s criminal conduct, thus placing “primary weight” on punishing
wrongdoing. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 51–52 (2003);
see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(1)–(4) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Only
after calculating the sentencing range do the Guidelines give “secondary weight” to utilitarian
concerns like deterrence and incapacitation. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra, at 52; see also U.S. SENT’G
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(b)–(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). The Guidelines on revocation
work the same way, using the gravity of the defendant’s conduct to determine the grade of the
violation, which in turn determines the recommended sentencing range. See id. §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.3(a),
7B1.4(a). Nevertheless, this structure does not mean the Guidelines require judges to adopt a
retributive theory of punishment. Because the severity of the defendant’s misconduct is always a
relevant factor in determining what sentence is necessary to achieve deterrence and public safety,
tying offense levels or violation grade to the defendant’s conduct can still reflect a purely utilitarian
theory of punishment. See United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106, 1108 (7th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir.
2007); United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2006).
314. Berman, supra note 295, at 49.
315. Id.
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retribution from consideration would give judges less, not more, reason to
punish violations of supervised release.
Second, rejecting the retributive theory of punishment could reduce
implicit racial bias in revocation of supervised release. A 2020 Sentencing
Commission report found that Black defendants comprise 24% of the
population under federal supervision (including both probation and
supervised release), yet 33.8% of defendants sentenced for violations. 316
Empirical analysis of state parole systems suggests that people of color
are treated more harshly in revocation proceedings, even controlling for
non-racial factors.317
There are multiple plausible explanations for this trend,318 but one
cause may be the retributive theory of revocation. Empirical studies show
“a deep and inextricable connection between race and retribution,”
including “a significant implicit association” between Black faces and
retributivist words, and a direct relationship between “implicit Blackretribution biases” and “support for retributive theories of punishment.”319
Retributive thinking appears rooted in intuitive, instinctive, or even
“biological” impulses, making it especially vulnerable to unconscious
biases.320 The retributive theory of revocation therefore may lead judges
to impose harsher punishments on people of color.321 If this is true, then
excluding the retributive theory would not only reduce revocation
sentences in individual cases, but also make revocation of supervised
316. Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 19.
317. See generally Jannetta et al., supra note 41; Bradner & Schiraldi, supra note 41; Tapia &
Harris, supra note 41.
318. For example, “biased policing could lead to more arrests for communities of color, which
would automatically initiate or be reason for revocation.” Jannetta et al., supra note 37, at 9.
Alternatively, conditions forbidding contact with anyone who has a felony conviction may weigh
heavier on people of color, forcing them “to choose between obeying the rules on one hand, or, on
the other, risking a parole violation by spending time with relatives and friends who could be valuable
sources of support, stability, housing, or employment connections.” Bradner & Schiraldi, supra note
41, at 5. Another explanation could be systematic racism in transportation or employment: “Black
and brown communities disproportionately lack access to adequate transportation, and requirements
to report for meetings with a parole officer will be more difficult for someone who lives in a
neighborhood with poor public transit coverage.” Id. (citation omitted). “Similarly, Black and brown
people face employment discrimination, and requirements to obtain employment and pay supervision
fees will . . . be even more difficult for people living in areas with limited employment options.” Id.
(citation omitted).
319. See Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith, & Koichi Hioki, Race and Retribution: An Empirical
Study of Implicit Bias and Punishment in America, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 839, 879–83 (2019).
320. Id. at 849–50.
321. See id. at 850–71 (explaining historical and psychological forces at play when people think
about retributive punishment); see also Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 17, 58 (2003) (“The dramatic increase in the severity of sentences, and the consequent
ballooning of the prison population, occurred largely in the 1980s and 1990s, and followed almost
immediately upon the shift from rehabilitation to retributive rationales for punishment . . . .”).
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release more equitable overall.
Finally, excluding the retributive theory of revocation would also end
the unnecessary and unfair practice of consecutive revocation sentencing
when defendants under supervision are convicted of new crimes. In about
one-third of revocations, defendants violate their supervised release by
committing new crimes.322 When this happens, the Sentencing Guidelines
recommend that the judge impose a revocation sentence to run
“consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any
criminal conduct that is the basis of the revocation.”323 In other words, the
Guidelines recommend that the judge impose a revocation sentence in
addition to and following the sentence for the new crime.324 In fact, the
Sentencing Commission adopted the “breach of trust” concept precisely
to justify a consecutive revocation sentence in this scenario.325
Committing a crime while on supervised release is obviously a serious
violation, yet consecutive revocation sentences are still arbitrary and
excessive.326 In some cases, these sentences may equal or even exceed the
322. Table E-7A, supra note 122. Courts hold that it does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
to charge a defendant with both a crime and a supervised release violation based on the same conduct.
See United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d
359, 362–63 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 789–90 (9th Cir. 1995). In
fact, the government may introduce the record of the criminal conviction at the revocation hearing as
sufficient proof of the violation. See United States v. Goodon, 742 F.3d 373, 375–76 (8th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Huusko, 275 F.3d 600,
602–03 (7th Cir. 2001).
323. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. B, introductory cmt (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018); see also id. § 7B1.3(f) (“Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation
or supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised release.”).
324. Similarly, when a judge sentences defendant for a conviction after a revocation hearing, the
Guidelines recommend that “any sentence of imprisonment for a criminal offense . . . be run
consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” Id. § 7B1.3 cmt. n.4.
325. Id. § 7A3(b). Otherwise, the Commission explained, “the revocation court [would]
substantially duplicate the sanctioning role of the court with jurisdiction over a defendant’s new
criminal conduct,” and “punishment imposed upon revocation [would] run concurrently with, and
thus generally be subsumed in, any sentence imposed for that new criminal conduct.” Id.
326. The Sentencing Commission’s confusion on this issue goes well beyond the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Commission’s 2020 report on Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations
analyzed trends in revocation hearings, yet combined defendants on probation with those on
supervised release as “offenders ‘sentenced to supervision.’” Federal Offenders Sentenced to
Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 2. Given the differences between probation and supervised
release, however, the demographics of these two populations are almost certainly different. For
example, because probation involves an act of trust while supervised release does not, defendants on
probation will tend to have less aggravated criminal histories than those on supervised release. And
since criminal history is an important factor at revocation hearings, judges are likely to punish
supervised-release violators more harshly than probation violators. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 7B1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). The Report’s failure to recognize this distinction
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punishment for the conviction—doubling the defendant’s total prison
time, solely for committing the offense while on supervised release.327
And even when consecutive revocation sentences are short, they are often
needless. In United States v. Ramos,328 a defendant on supervised release
killed a police officer, a crime for which she was convicted in state court
and sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment.329 She was released
from state prison after twenty-two years, then “immediately transferred to
federal custody” for a revocation hearing on the ground that the killing
also violated her supervised release.330 The judge revoked her release and
sentenced her to another two years in federal prison, explaining that his
“‘role . . . [wa]s not to sentence [the defendant] for’ the death of [the
officer], but to sentence her for the ‘breach of trust’ associated with the
violation of her supervised release.”331 It is hard to believe that after this

clouds its analysis. Going forward, the Commission must make sure to distinguish between these two
systems in order to obtain a clear understanding of revocation practices.
327. See, e.g., United States v. Duckett, 935 F.3d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (offense sentence
thirteen months, revocation sentence twenty-four months); United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d
683, 685–86 (3d Cir. 2018) (offense sentence twenty-four to forty-eight months, revocation sentence
forty months); United States v. Valure, 835 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2016) (offense sentence sixtythree months, revocation sentence sixty months); United States v. Reyes-Solosa, 761 F.3d 972, 973–
74 (9th Cir. 2014) (offense sentence six months, revocation sentence twelve months); United States
v. Ceballos-Santa Cruz, 756 F.3d 635, 636–37 (8th Cir. 2014) (offense sentence six months,
revocation sentence eighteen months); United States v. Banks, 743 F.3d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2014) (offense
sentence eighteen months, revocation sentence thirty-three months); United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d
187, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2013) (offense sentence nine to twenty-three months, revocation sentence thirtyseven months); United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir. 1999) (offense sentence thirtysix months, revocation sentence forty-eight months); United States v. McGee, 60 F.3d 1266, 1267–
68 (7th Cir. 1995) (offense sentence twenty-four months, revocation sentence twenty-four months).
328. 979 F.3d 994 (2d Cir. 2020).
329. Id. at 997.
330. Id. at 997, 1000.
331. Id. at 997; see also Andrews v. Warden, 958 F.3d 1072, 1074 (11th Cir. 2020) (offense
sentence 188 months, revocation sentence twenty-four months); United States v. Watters, 947 F.3d
493, 495 (8th Cir. 2020) (offense sentence 262 months, revocation sentence sixty months); United
States v. Cruz-Olavarria, 919 F.3d 661, 661 (1st Cir. 2019) (offense sentence 120 months, revocation
sentence twenty-four months); United States v. Trung Dang, 907 F.3d 561, 562–63 (8th Cir. 2018)
(offense sentence 240 months, revocation sentence sixty months); United States v. Ferguson, 876 F.3d
512, 513–14 (3d Cir. 2017) (offense sentence 120–240 months, revocation sentence twenty-four
months); United States v. Mulero-Algarin, 866 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (offense sentence 120 months,
revocation sentence thirty-six months); United States v. Hernandez-Pineda, 849 F.3d 769, 771 (8th
Cir. 2017) (offense sentence 300 months, revocation sentence twenty-four months); United States v.
Peterson, 852 F.3d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 2017) (offense sentence forty-eight months, revocation sentence
six months); United States v. Johnson, 786 F.3d 241, 242–43 (2d Cir. 2015) (offense sentence 216
months, revocation sentence thirty-six months); United States v. Rivera, 784 F.3d 1012, 1014 (5th
Cir. 2015) (offense sentence 336 months, revocation sentence sixty months); United States v.
Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 199 (6th Cir. 2011) (offense sentence 144 months, revocation sentence thirtysix months); United States v. Moore, 624 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 2010) (offense sentence 188 months,
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defendant served a twenty-two-year state prison sentence and was
released on parole, there was any legitimate need to incarcerate her for
another two years in federal prison.
Without the retributive theory of punishment, there is no justification
for imposing consecutive revocation sentences in these cases. When a
defendant on supervised release is convicted of a new crime, the judge
sentencing the defendant for that conviction will already consider both the
criminal conduct and the fact that the defendant committed it while under
supervised release.332 That judge will likely view the criminal conduct as
more aggravated because the defendant committed it while under
supervision, and very likely will impose a longer sentence as a result.333
Because the judge sentencing the defendant for the conviction already
imposes an appropriate sentence based on all the relevant factors, there is
no utilitarian benefit to having a different judge at a revocation hearing
decide whether additional punishment is necessary for the violation of
supervised release. The judge who sentences the defendant for the
conviction already considers the appropriate punishment to deter and
incapacitate based on the circumstances of the offense, including the fact
that the defendant was under supervision at the time of the criminal
conduct. The judge at the revocation hearing is no better suited to
determine what punishment is necessary for deterrence and
incapacitation. In fact, the revocation judge is in a worse position, as it is
“difficult in many instances for the court or the parties to obtain the
information . . . and witnesses” regarding the underlying conduct.334
The only plausible justification for a consecutive revocation sentence
when defendants on supervised release are convicted of new crimes is as
retribution for their “breach of trust inherent in the conditions of
supervision.”335 Under the retributive theory of revocation, the judge who
imposed the supervision would arguably be better placed to assess the
appropriate penalty for the defendant’s “breach of trust.” But without the
retributive theory, there is no legitimate reason for imposing a consecutive
revocation sentence twenty-four months); United States v. Huusko, 275 F.3d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 2001)
(offense sentence 180 months, revocation sentence twenty-four months); United States v. Woodrup,
86 F.3d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 1996) (offense sentence 240 months, revocation sentence twenty-four
months); United States v. Caves, 73 F.3d 823, 824 (8th Cir. 1996) (offense sentence 108 months,
revocation sentence twelve months).
332. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(adding “2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice
sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape
status”).
333. See id.
334. Id. § 7A3(b).
335. Id.
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revocation sentence. While there may be grounds to impose a concurrent
revocation sentence,336 consecutive revocation sentencing is not justified
by the purely utilitarian considerations listed in § 3583(e)(3).
C.

Judicial Pathology in Revocation

Professor Bill Stuntz famously diagnosed American criminal justice as
“pathological.”337 No matter who comes into power or how the world
changes, the criminal law seems to grow harsher and more expansive over
time.338 Professor Stuntz attributed this trend to a “tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more
and broader crimes,” versus the “growing marginalization of judges, who
alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader
ones.”339 In this two-against-one battle, “prosecutorial and legislative
power reinforce each other, and together both these powers push courts to
the periphery.”340 To cure these pathological politics, Stuntz looked to the
courts as the branch most likely to push back against expanding criminal
liability and “take the interests of defendants into account.”341
The law of federal sentencing, however, reveals a different, darker
institutional dynamic—a judicial pathology in revocation of supervised
release. This pathology began with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
which transferred authority over community supervision from the Parole

336. There are potentially three utilitarian justifications for imposing a concurrent revocation
sentence when a defendant on supervised release commits a new crime. First, if the defendant is
ultimately not prosecuted for the new crime, then the judge may wish to revoke release in order to
provide deterrence and incapacitation. Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra
note 118, at 2. Second, if the defendant is prosecuted and convicted for the new crime, but there is a
possibility that the conviction could be overturned on appeal, then the judge might impose a
concurrent revocation sentence to ensure the defendant spends time in prison. Finally, even if the
defendant’s conviction is not overturned, the judge may wish to ensure that the violation of supervised
release is reflected in the criminal history in case the defendant is ever convicted of another federal
offense. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REVOCATIONS AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS 5–7 (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2019/20190131_Revocations.pdf [https://perma.cc/92GA-9VEZ] (explaining that a
revocation sentence can impact a defendant’s criminal history score by increasing the number of
“points” assigned to their original conviction, or by “reviv[ing]” an old conviction that would
otherwise not be counted).
337. See generally Stuntz, supra note 55.
338. See id. at 507.
339. Id. at 510; see also id. at 557 (“Courts are a good deal less prone to that bias [toward
overcriminalization].”); id. at 576 (“Courts’ lawmaking tendencies are more balanced, less tilted in
favor of broader [criminal] liability.”).
340. Id. at 528.
341. Id. at 541.
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Commission to the federal courts.342 Far from “marginaliz[ing]” courts,343
Congress placed judges at the center of supervised release by authorizing
them to impose terms of supervision and monitor compliance.
While lawmakers hoped that courts would use supervision sparingly,344
judges instead embraced their new authority, imposing supervised release
on virtually every defendant sentenced to more than a year in prison.345
Today, the judiciary polices a population of more than 100,000 people
under supervised release—five times more than were under parole in
1984.346 In 1994, a congressional study committee proposed returning
control over community supervision to the Parole Commission, yet the
Judicial Conference of the United States actively opposed the idea.347
Lawmakers also sought to limit judicial power by omitting any
mechanism for judges to revoke supervised release. Unlike parole,
violations of supervised release would only be punishable through a
criminal contempt prosecution providing a full criminal trial and all the
traditional constitutional rights. Yet within two years, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts successfully lobbied Congress to add a
revocation provision that created a more streamlined process for
punishing defendants who violated conditions of supervision, without a
jury or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.348 Judges revoke supervised
release in one-third of all cases,349 nearly 17,000 times each year.350
Even in enacting the revocation provision, Congress sought to
constrain the courts by excluding retribution from the list of factors they
could consider under § 3583(e)(3).351 Yet this attempt failed, as a majority
of circuit courts and Supreme Court justices endorsed a “primarily”
retributive theory of revocation.352 The Sentencing Commission—a
commission within the judicial branch353—also enacted Sentencing
Guidelines that described violations in moral, backwards-looking terms,
342. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part I (1910–1972), 61 FED. PROB.
23, 23–24 (1997).
343. See Stuntz, supra note 55, at 510.
344. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 708–09 (2000); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 125 (1983).
345. See Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 3–4.
346. See id. at 69; Table E-1, supra note 119; Schuman, supra note 82, at 589; PROBATION AND
PAROLE 1984, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. 4 (1984).
347. See David N. Adair, Revocation of Supervised Release—A Judicial Function, 6 FED. SENT.
REP. 190, 190–91 (1994).
348. See 131 CONG. REC. 14,169 (1985).
349. Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release, supra note 118, at 4, 63.
350. Table E-7A, supra note 122.
351. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
352. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A3(b) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
353. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
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using the “breach of trust” concept to justify consecutive revocation
sentencing. While Professor Stuntz envisioned courts as the institution
most likely to protect criminal defendants against prosecutors and
legislatures, the federal judiciary has instead played a key role in
expanding state power to punish through the retributive theory of
revocation.
What is most pathological about this development is the extreme
judicial investment in the revocation process. Federal judges not only
impose conditions of supervision and monitor compliance, but also
sentence defendants for violations. Because judges are the parties whose
“trust” is “breached,” they are effectively sentencing crimes against
themselves. Perhaps it is natural that the victim of a violation would seek
retribution against the violator.354 Yet this personal stake in the revocation
also creates a conflict of interest, contrary to “the due process maxim that
‘no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try
cases where he has an interest in the outcome.’”355 Rather than sanction
violators for their disrespect, judges should revoke supervised release only
to deter and incapacitate.
CONCLUSION
Congress created supervised release as a program of transitional
support for former prisoners. Lawmakers eventually authorized
revocation for violations, but limited its purposes to deterrence and
incapacitation, not retribution. Nevertheless, the federal judiciary
endorsed a retributive theory of revocation based on a “breach of trust”
concept that lacks legal support, needlessly amplifies punishment, and
suggests a conflict of interest on the part of the sentencing judge. Adopting
a purely utilitarian approach to revocation can help break the connection
between mass supervision and mass incarceration.

354. Friedrich Nietzsche vividly described the personal element in retributive punishment: “[T]o
what extent can suffering balance debts or guilt? To the extent that to make suffer was in the highest
degree pleasurable, to the extent that the injured party exchanged for the loss he had sustained,
including the displeasure caused by the loss, an extraordinary counterbalancing pleasure: that of
making suffer—a genuine festival . . . .” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 65
(Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1967)
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
355. Williams v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905–06 (2016). Defendants have
unsuccessfully challenged the probation officer’s part in revocation proceedings as violating the
separation of powers. See United States v. Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1438 (M.D. Ala. 1997); see
also Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104
GEO. L.J. 291, 347 (2016) (“[P]robation officers arguably inhabit the roles of victim, witness,
investigator, prosecutor, and judge, all in the same case.”). But no one has ever questioned the
sentencing judge’s conflict of interest.

